TOURKOCHORITI (DO NOT DELETE)

4/17/2015 4:38 PM

THE TRANSATLANTIC FLOW OF DATA AND THE
NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION IN THE EUROPEAN
DATA PRIVACY REGULATION: IN SEARCH FOR LEGAL
PROTECTION AGAINST SURVEILLANCE
IOANNA TOURKOCHORITI*
Europe regulates data privacy against violations coming from
the private sector more strictly than the U.S.1 The EU Directive
95/46/EC has led to the implementation of a sophisticated system
of data privacy regulation having strong enforcement
mechanisms. 2 The European Commission has submitted a
proposal for a new regulation, which updates data privacy law
protection strengthening individual rights and foreseeing
important penalties.3 Both the existing Directive and the Proposed
*
Lecturer, School of Law, National University of Ireland, Galway. The
author would like to thank the participants in the Roundtable “Constitutionalism
Across Borders in the Struggle Against Terrorism” of the Research Group on
Constitutional Responses to Terrorism, of the International Association of
Constitutional Law, held at Harvard Law School on March 6–7, 2014, for
contributions of materials on the topic and interesting discussions. Special thanks
go to David Cole, Vicki Jakson, Konrad Lanchmayer, Valerio Lubello, Valsamis
Mitsilegas, Kim Lane Scheppele, Mark Tushnet and Arianna Vedaschi.
1 See generally Ioanna Tourkochoriti, The Snowden Revelations, the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership and the Divide Between U.S.-E.U. in Data Privacy
Protection, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 161 (2014).
2 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31
[hereinafter
Data
Protection
Directive],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir199546_part1_en.pdf (laying out regulations for protecting data privacy).
3 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM
(2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed Regulation], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (proposing “a new legal
framework for the protection of personal data”).
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Regulation do not apply to activities concerning “national
security.”4 The EU has succeeded through negotiations to level up
the standards of data privacy protection in the private sector in the
U.S. through the Safe Harbor Agreement.5 This agreement also
foresees an exemption of its application in case of national security,
public interest, or law enforcement requirements.6
The European Regulation of privacy is indirectly affecting the
access of public authorities to private data by limiting the
possibility of private actors to collect and store this data, which
they will be required to transmit to surveillance authorities.7 A
legal tool elaborated for a specific purpose to limit the access of
private actors to personal information can operate protectively for
another purpose: to limit access of the state to the same
information. The Directive goes as far as prohibiting profiling
altogether and establishing a “right to be forgotten.”8 It thus can
limit the amount of information that private actors collect, which
then results in the state authorities limiting their “data mining”
potentiality.
Surveillance transcends the public/private divide, 9 as the
PRISM program revealed recently gives public authorities access to
information collected by the private sector. This paper analyzes
the existing protection through the Safe Harbor Agreement and the
Proposed Regulation, which strengthens the legal framework of
4 See Tourkochoriti, supra note 1 (noting that the Directive is inapplicable in
certain cases); Data Protection Directive, supra note 2, art. 3(2) (clarifying that the
Directive does not “apply to the processing of personal data . . . in any case to
processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security”); see also
Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, art. 2(2)(a) (the Proposed Regulation foresees
explicitly that it does not apply to the processing of personal data “in the course of
an activity which falls outside the scope of Union Law, in particular concerning
national security”).
5 See Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, EXPORT.GOV (July 21,
2000)
[hereinafter
Safe
Harbor
Privacy
Principles],
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp (explaining the Directive
mandates that personal data transfers to non-EU countries must provide an
“adequate” level of protection).
6 Id. at 1 (stating the EU required “’adequacy standard’” on personal data
transfers may be limited “to the extent necessary to meet national security, public
interest, or law enforcement requirements”).
7
See infra Part 3.1.
8
Id.
9 Cf. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934,
1935 (2013) (arguing “public and private surveillance are simply related parts of
the same problem, rather than wholly discrete.”).
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privacy against collection of data by the private sector. It analyzes
how limiting the possibility of private actors to collect information
may have an impact on what information the state collects from
private actors. It then suggests ways of interpreting the national
security exception existing both in the EU Regulation and the
Transatlantic agreements in a way as to narrow its scope, in
reference to the ECHR in Europe and to the ICCPR. It also points
out the need for signing a new treaty to fill legal gaps in the
protection of transfer of data through Cloud computing. The
prima facie legal gap in the protection of privacy concerning Cloud
computing can be filled in reference to other international
instruments protecting privacy.
The transatlantic flow of data is of critical importance for both
the economy of the EU and the U.S.10 Following the revelations,
the European Commission made clear that the standards of data
protection will not be part of the on-going negotiations for a
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 11 while the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament insists
that a separate agreement is necessary on strong data privacy
protections.12 The Commission refuses to negotiate data protection
with the U.S. as, in its opinion, this is a “fundamental right” which
is not negotiable.13
10 See, e.g., EUR. CTR. FOR INT’L POL. ECON., THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF
GETTING DATA PROTECTION RIGHT: PROTECTING PRIVACY, TRANSMITTING DATA,
MOVING COMMERCE 7 (2013) (noting that if services and cross-border data flows
were to be disrupted as a consequence of the discontinuity of binding corporate
rules, model contract clauses and the Safe Harbor, the negative impact on EU
GDP could reach -0.8% to -1.3% and EU services exports to the U.S. would drop
by -6.7% due to the loss of competitiveness).
11 Press Release IP/13/1166, Eur. Comm’n, European Commission Calls on
the U.S. to Restore Trust in EU-U.S. Data Flows (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Press
Release IP/13/1166], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-131166_en.htm (calling for actions to “restore trust in data flows between the EU
and the U.S.” and to “maintain the continuity of data flows”).
12 See Eur. Parliament Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Draft Working Document on
Foreign Policy Aspects of the Inquiry on Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens, at
3 (Nov. 4, 2013) available at http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=32888
[Working Document on Mass Surveillance] (noting “it is crucial that agreement on
strong data privacy protections is achieved separately from the [Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership].”).
13 See Memorandum MEMO/13/1059, Eur. Comm’n, Restoring Trust in EUUS Data Flows – Frequently Asked Questions, at 8 (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter
European Commission Memo] ("‘Data protection is not red tape or a tariff. It is a
fundamental right and as such it is not negotiable.’”) (quoting Vice President
Viviane Reding from a prior speech). Viviane Reding, Vice President, Eur.
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The ECtHR has issued a number of decisions on surveillance
issues, some of them more protective than others.14 The same court
has elaborated jurisprudence concerning the conditions under
which European states can maintain databases on their citizens for
surveillance and law enforcement purposes. 15 Furthermore,
following the revelations, the Advocate General of the Court of
Justice of the European Union issued a very promising opinion on
the Data Retention Directive for the purpose of the investigation,
detection, and prosecution of serious crime.16
Much of the foreign intelligence information collected by the
NSA is shared with the governments of many other nations. 17
While the governments of the Member States are promoting
cooperation with the U.S. on intelligence matters, the EU officials
show a greater sensibility in favor of protecting data privacy. 18
Within the Member States, Europeans are split between the need of
satisfying the negative reactions of their constituents to the
revelations and using the result of their cooperation with the U.S.
for their own security purposes.
One method of collecting Internet data is the PRISM program,
which collects data from companies like Google, Apple and
Facebook if the communications contain certain terms chosen by
Comm’n, SPEECH 13/867, Towards a More Dynamic Transatlantic Area of
Growth and Investment (Oct. 29, 2013).
14 See Klass v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14 (1978) analyzed infra Part 3.3
(pointing out the court does not recognize high standards of protection).
15 See infra Part 3.3.
16 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine, and Natural
Res. et al., [2013] (H. Ct.) (Ir.) [hereinafter Digital Rights Ireland Ltd.], available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=145562&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=187576 (ruling
on the “circumstances in which it is constitutionally possible for the European
Union to impose a limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights”); see also
Monika Ermert, EU Data Retention Might Not Be Proportional to Risks (July 9, 2013),
http://policyreview.info/articles/news/eu-data-retention-might-not-beproportional-risks/170 (during the oral hearing of the case in July, the judges
seemed willing to confirm this approach).
17 See Justin Cremer, Denmark is One of the NSA’s ‘9-Eyes’, COPENHAGEN POST
(Nov. 4, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://cphpost.dk/news/denmark-is-one-of-the-nsas9-eyes.7611.html (stating the NSA is reported to have a close relationship with the
UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, called the ‘5-Eyes’, but a more restricted
intelligence-sharing relationship exists between Denmark, Norway, the
Netherlands and France, which altogether compose the ‘9-Eyes.’ The NSA has a
less intimate relationship with Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, and Italy,
which adds up to the ‘14 eyes’ with the other nine countries.).
18
Press Release IP/13/1166, supra note 11.
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the NSA.19 The program gathers “massive data on life-styles in
order to elaborate patterns and profiles concerning political
attitudes and economic choices.” 20 Another method collecting
Internet content is “upstream” collection, which gives the NSA
direct access to the data packets traveling through domestic and
international fiber optic cables.21 “Data is copied from both public
and private networks . . . and from central exchanges which switch
Internet traffic between the major carriers, through agreements
negotiated with . . . the operating companies . . . .”22 The NSA is
reported to be copying all emails and text messages with one end
outside of the United States in order to pull out communications

19 See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/usintelligence-miningdata-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secretprogram/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html
(discussing a top-secret document discovered by The Washington Post that
reveals a program, code-named PRISM, which allows the NSA to hack into the
central servers of nine leading Internet companies, “extracting audio and video
chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs that enable analysts
to track foreign targets”).
20 See Note by Caspar Bowden, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Eur.
Parliament, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs: The
US Surveillance Programmes and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Fundamental
Rights, at 8 (2013) (noting that by “gathering massive data on life-styles in order
to elaborate patterns and profiles concerning political attitudes and economic
choices, PRISM seems to have allowed an unprecedented scale and depth in
intelligence gathering. . . .”).
21 See Craig Timberg, NSA Slide Shows Surveillance of Undersea Cables, THE
WASH. POST (July 10, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0710/business/40480665_1_nsa-slide-prism (discussing a classified NSA slide that
describes “Upstream” data collection as accessing “’communications on fiber
cables and infrastructure as data flows past.’”); see also Jennifer Valentino-DeVries
& Siobhan Gorman, What You Need to Know on New Details of NSA Spying, WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
20,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324108204579025222244858490.h
tml (stating that “Upstream” data collection involves splitting fiber optic lines at a
junction, and then copying the traffic to an NSA processing system that filters
through the data based on NSA parameters); Brett Max Kaufman, A Guide to What
We Know About the NSA’s Dragnet Searches of Your Communications, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/nationalsecurity/guide-what-we-now-know-about-nsas-dragnet-searches-yourcommunications (contrasting “Upstream” data collection with PRISM, noting that
the former “involves the collection of communications—both their metadata and
their content—as they pass through undersea fiber-optic cables.”).
22 See Bowden, supra note 20, at 13 (2013) (describing the “Upstream”
surveillance program).
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that match certain “selectors” relevant to foreign intelligence. 23
The agency has collaborated with domestic telecommunications
companies to give it the ability to directly access up to
approximately seventy-five percent of U.S. communications.24 A
program called XKEYSCORE allows the government to search
essentially any Internet activity using approved search terms, and
has vast capabilities, feeding much of it to other specialized
databases.25 It enables an analyst to discover “strong selectors”
(search parameters which identify or can be used to extract data
precisely about a target and to look for “anomalous events”). 26
Because the amount of data that is scanned and stored is vast, it
can only be stored for a limited time, three to five days for content
and thirty days for metadata; other databases receiving
information from XKEYSCORE keep the content of emails and
email metadata for up to five years.27 BULLRUN is the codename
23 See Charlie Savage, NSA Said to Search Content of Messages to and from U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/us/broadersifting-of-data-abroad-is-seen-bynsa.html?ref=todayspaper&pagewanted=all
(describing how NSA officials must first collect all cross-border data, and a
computer searches through the data using “selectors” or other keywords to
selectively store data for human analysts to review later).
24 See Valentino-DeVries & Gorman, supra note 21 (revealing that the NSA
can access 75% of the telecommunications traffic in the U.S. through U.S.
telecommunications companies, including not only metadata but the actual
content of online communications).
25 See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a
User Does on the Internet,’ THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-programonline-data (describing how NSA analysts can use XKEYSCORE and other
systems to mine enormous databases by completing a simple on-screen form
giving only a broad justification for the search); XKeyscore Presentation (Feb. 25,
2008) THE GUARDIAN [hereinafter XKeyscore Presentation], available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscoreprogram-full-presentation (revealing slides from a presentation explaining the
capabilities of XKeyscore).
26 Greenwald, supra note 25; XKeyscore Presentation, supra note 25, at 15.
27 XKeyscore Presentation, supra note 25, at 2, 17; see Marc Ambinder, What’s
XKEYSCORE?,
THE
WEEK
(July
31,
2013,
3:58
PM),
http://theweek.com/article/index/247684/whats-xkeyscore
(describing
XKEYSCORE as something that doesn’t collect data, but rather “a series of user
interfaces, backend databases, servers and software that selects certain types of
metadata that the NSA has ALREADY collected using other methods.”); see also
21% of the Database Query Errors in NSA Report Involved the Phone Internet Dragnet
Database,
EMPTYWHEEL
(Aug.
16,
2013),
https://www.emptywheel.net/2013/08/16/21-of-the-database-query-errors-in1q-2012-involved-the-phone-dragnet-database/ (noting that 21% of the database
query errors used by the NSA involve the MARINA database, which stores
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for another program of the last decade, that can break into
encryption technologies,28 while information which recently came
to light on the NSA’s TAO hacking unit reveals they have been
infiltrating computers around the world.29
The U.S. government has established several data centers
to aggregate, compare, data-mine, and analyze information. The
National Counterterrorism Center operates under the Director of
National Intelligence and pulls employees from other federal
agencies, like the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Agriculture and
the U.S. Capitol Police.30 The Center’s mission is to “analyze and
integrate” all terrorism and counterterrorism intelligence,
collecting data from all other agencies.31 It also assesses data from
international travel-related datasets, immigration benefits-related
datasets, and financial-related datasets.32 The FBI’s Investigative
Internet data).
28 See James Ball, Julian Borger & Glenn Greenwald, Revealed: How US and
UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codessecurity (revealing an NSA classification guide which states, "’Project Bullrun
deals with NSA's abilities to defeat the encryption used in specific network
communication technologies. Bullrun involves multiple sources, all of which are
extremely sensitive.’").
29 See SPIEGEL Staff, Inside TAO: Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit,
SPIEGEL
ONLINE
(Dec.
29,
2013,
9:18
AM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-ineffort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html (revealing that the NSA’s TAO
hacking unit is considered the agency’s “top secret weapon” capable of
maintaining its own covert network that hacks into computers around the world).
30 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 496 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 15 (2007) [hereinafter National Security Act of 1947]
(establishing a system for national security); U.S. Dep’t of Justice et al.,
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence Community, Federal
Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security
Concerning
Information
Sharing
(2003),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/mou-infoshare.pdf; see also Exec. Order No.
13354,
69
Fed.
Reg.
53589
(Aug.
27,
2004),
available
at
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (stating that the
Center is also given the authority to “receive, retain, and disseminate
information” from any domestic government agency or other source; each agency
that holds terrorism information must provide the Center with access to the
information).
31
National Security Act of 1947, supra note 30; see generally Rachel LevinsonWaldman, What the Government Does With Americans’ Data, Brennan Ctr. for Justice
at N.Y.U. L. Sch., at 20 (2013).
32 See Guidelines for Access, Retention, Use, and Dissemination by the
National Counterterrorism Center and Other Agencies of Information in Datasets
Containing Non-Terrorism Information, at 12 (2012), available at
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Data Warehouse conducts data mining, which it collects from the
Departments of Treasury, State and Homeland Security, the
Bureau of Prisons, and non-governmental sources.33 The National
Security Agency Data Center also collects material.34 A series of
statutes and executive orders facilitate the sharing of information
among all levels of government and private sector (ISE-SAR).35 For
the information to be retained an assessment is required by an
analyst that there is a “potential terrorism nexus,” which is
established by the federal government.36 The criterion used is that
which would make a “reasonable person” suspicious.37

http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/nctc_guidelines.pdf (according to the
2012 Guidelines to the authority, the NCTC can disseminate information that
“reasonably appears to be necessary to understand or assess terrorism
information”); see generally Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 20.
33
See Report on the Investigative Data Warehouse, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND.,
§
4
(Apr.
2009)
[hereinafter
Report
on
IDW],
https://www.eff.org/issues/foia/investigative-data-warehouse-report
(describing the FBI’s Investigative Data Warehouse as a massive centralized
online repository for “intelligence and investigative data”); see also Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Dep’t of Justice, Request for Records Disposition Authority, N1-6510-31
(2010),
available
at
http://www.archives.gov/recordsmgmt/rcs/schedules/departments/department-of-justice/rg-0065/n1-065-10031_sf115.pdf (stating that the “Investigative Data Warehouse (lDW) is a
centralized repository for copies of intelligence and investigative data with
advanced search capabilities” providing users with “information needed to
successfully accomplish the FBI's counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and law
enforcement missions.”).
34 Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 22 (2013); James Bamford, The NSA Is
Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15,
2012, 7:24 PM) www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1.
35 Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 23 (2013).
36 See Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Functional Standard (FS)
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Version 1.5 (ISE-FS-200), at 2 (2009)
[hereinafter Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Functional Standard],
available
at
http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/ISE-FS-200_ISESAR_Functional_Standard_V1_5_Issued_2009.pdf (detailing that an Information
Sharing Environment-Suspicious Activity Report is a Suspicious Activity Report
“that has been determined, pursuant to a two-part process, to have a potential
terrorism nexus (i.e., to be reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated
with terrorism.”)); see also Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 24 (stating that
“[c]ertain criminal behaviors are considered automatic indicators of a terrorism
nexus—[such as] attempting to enter a restricted site,” while other non-criminal
behavior can still “trigger a finding of a potential terrorism nexus” if the activity
“would make a ‘reasonable person’ suspicious.”).
37 Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Functional Standard, supra note
36, at 29–30 (defining potential criminal or non-criminal activity that would
require additional investigation).
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1. BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EU AND U.S. DATA REGULATION
REGIMES AND THE SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENT
There are many differences between the EU and U.S. data
protection regimes that derive principally from the trust of
Europeans towards the state to regulate the private sector
containing the data and the distrust towards the state in the U.S.38
The differences concern first, the fundamental presumptions
concerning the processing of personal data. The presumption in
the U.S. is that the processing of personal data is permitted unless
it causes harm or is limited by law.39 The opposite presumption is
dominant in the EU where processing is prohibited unless there is
a legal basis that allows it. 40 Second, the limits on contractual
freedom differ. The EU Directive does not allow a data subject to
enter into an agreement that permits a data controller from
derogating fundamentally from their basic duties on the basis of
Article 6 principles relating to data quality and Article 12
concerning access rights of the data subject to the data.41 The U.S.
data protection regime affords contract and market mechanisms
greater latitude in setting data privacy standards and permits a
significant degree of contractual “override” of the privacy-related
interests of data subjects. Third, there are differences concerning
the coverage of protection. The Directive is broad in scope and
applies to the processing of personal data in the private and public
sectors. U.S. law contains only limited sector-specific protections
for sensitive information. It does not generally restrict automated
processing.42 Fourth, there are differences in the definition of the
38 Tourkochoriti, supra note 1, at 170 (interpreting the divergence in systems
to be due to a difference in how citizens understand the role of the state).
39 Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1978–79 (2013) (discussing the U.S. approach
that is largely unregulated, giving companies freedom to “try new kinds of data
processing”).
40 Data Protection Directive, supra note 2, arts. 1, 5, 6, 7 (regulating the
processing of personal data).
41 Id.; see also Lee A. Bygrave, Transatlantic Tensions on Data Privacy 6
(Transworld: The Transatlantic Relationship and the Future Global Governance,
Working
Paper
No.
19,
Apr.
2013),
available
at
http://www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW_WP_19.pdf (discussing the “basic
differences in the US and EU approach to data privacy regulation.”).
42 Schwartz, supra note 39, at 1979 (discussing the U.S. sectoral approach to
data privacy restrictions).
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protected data. The EU protects information that is identifiable to
a person, whereas the U.S. protects information that is actually
linked to an identified person. 43 The EU approach is over
inclusive, whereas the U.S. approach is under inclusive, given that
whether information can be re-identified depends upon technology
and corporate practices that permit the linking of de-identified
data with already identified data. 44 Fifth, the scope of the
protection differs, as generally under EU law, as well as under the
law of the Council of Europe, data concerning activities even of a
professional nature are protected. 45 Finally, the powers of the
enforcing authorities differ. Member states have established
independent authorities to implement the Directive in the EU that
monitor and enforce the data privacy laws, thereby contributing to
its consistent application throughout the Union.46 In the U.S., the
Federal Trade Commission shares some of the powers used by its
counterpart authorities in Europe to combat unfair or deceptive
acts or practices affecting commerce. 47 There are, nevertheless,
limits on the scope of its activities. The Federal Trade Commission
does not have jurisdiction over all companies, 48 and its
43 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the
United States and European Union, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 880 (2014) (explaining the
difference between the U.S. and EU systems in its treatment of data “in situations
where the data is merely identifiable but the people to whom the data pertains are
not currently identified”). Under EU law, an identifiable individual is an
individual which, “while not identified, is described in this information in a way
which makes it possible to find out who the data subject is by conducting further
research.” EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. & COUNCIL OF EUR.,
HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 39 (2013).
44 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 43, at 893–94 (discussing the concerns about
computerized, automated decision making).
45 See Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker and Markus Schecke GbR &
Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. 662, ¶ 59 (“The European Court of
Human Rights has held on this point, with reference to the interpretation of
Article 8 of the Convention, that the term ‘private life’ must not be interpreted
restrictively . . . .“).
46 Data Protection Directive, supra note 2, art. 28 (requiring each Member
State to create a supervisory authority and laying out the responsibilities of this
supervisory authority).
47 The Department of Transportation has similar authority over air carriers.
49 U.S.C. § 41712 (1994) (granting authority to the Secretary of Transportation to
investigate “unfair or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition”).
48 Exempt from the FTC’s jurisdiction are many types of financial
institutions, airlines, telecommunications carriers and other types of entities. 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1952) (creating exemptions for “banks, savings and loan
institutions . . . federal credit unions . . . common carriers . . . air carriers and
foreign air carriers . . . .”).
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enforcement has not extended to the narrow range of Fair
Information Practices used in the United States.
The standards of transferring data set by the 1995 EU Data
Protection directive presuppose that the Commission determines
that a non-EU country ensures an “adequate level of protection.”49
The EU privacy regime has succeeded through these “adequacy
decisions” in leveling up the protection of privacy in the U.S.50 The
Department of Commerce of the U.S. issued the Safe Harbor
Principles, recognized by the European Commission. 51 The
49 Articles 25 and 26 of the Data Protection Directive of October 24, 1995 lay
out the legal framework for transfers of personal data from the EU to third
countries outside the EEA. Both the law of the Council of Europe and the
European Union law foresee contractual clauses between the data exporting
controller and the recipient in the third country as a possible means of
safeguarding a sufficient level of data protection at the recipient. The European
Commission has developed standard contractual clauses officially certified as
proof of adequate data protection. Controllers can formulate ad hoc contractual
clauses. Protection can also be guaranteed by binding corporate rules, usually
multilateral, which may involve several European data protection authorities at
the same time. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document
Setting Up a Framework for the Structure of Binding Corporate Rules, WP 154 (June 24,
2008) (establishing a framework to provide guidance to organizations developing
BCRs regarding international transfers of personal data); Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party, Working Document Setting Up a Table with the Elements
and Principles to Be Found in Binding Corporate Rules, WP 153 (June 24, 2008) (laying
out the criteria for approval of BCRs).
50 According to Article 26(1) of the Data Protection Directive, which contains
provisions similar to those of the Additional Protocol to Convention 108, interests
of the data subject may justify the free flow of data to a third country if the data
subject has given unambiguous consent to the export of the data, the data subject
enters or prepares to enter into a contractual relationship which clearly requires
that the data be transferred to a recipient abroad, or transfer is necessary in order
to protect the vital interest of the data subject, in case the data exists in public
registers, the legitimate interests of others may justify free trans-border flow of
data. This is also justified by an important public interest, apart from matters of
national or public security, as they are not covered by the Data Protection
Directive, or to establish, exercise or defend legal claims. Data Protection
Directive, supra note 2, art. 26(1) (providing that a transfer of personal data to a
third country may take place with other conditions).
51 The Safe Harbor decision was determined following an opinion of Article
29 Working Party and an opinion of the Article 31 Committee delivered by a
qualified majority of Member States. In accordance with Council Decision
1999/468, 1999, O.J. (L 184) 23 (EC), the Safe Harbor decision was subject to prior
scrutiny by the European Parliament. Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, of 26
July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 [hereinafter Safe Harbor Decision]
(implementing the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles).
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principles institute a system of self-certification of the companies,
which have signed up for it by notifying the U.S. Department of
Commerce while the U.S. Federal Trade Commission enforces the
agreement.52 Signing up for the arrangements is voluntary and
resubmitted on an annual basis. 53 Financial services and
telecommunication industries are outside the Federal Trade
Commission enforcement powers and thus are excluded from the
Safe Harbor, 54 whereas many industry and services sectors are
present among certified companies including Internet companies
and industries ranging from information and computer services to
pharmaceuticals, travel and tourism services, healthcare and credit
card services, which provide services in the EU internal market.55
The Safe Harbor Principles are intended for use by U.S.
organizations receiving personal data from the EU for the purpose
of meeting the presumption of “adequacy” foreseen in the EU
regulations. Decisions by organizations to qualify for the safe
harbor are voluntary, but once it complies with the principles,
which rely in whole or in part on self-regulation, the failure to
comply must be actionable.56 According to the principles of the
safe harbor agreement, an organization must inform individuals
52 The Department of Commerce reviews Safe Harbor self-certifications and
annual recertification submissions that it receives from companies to ensure that
they include all the elements required and updates a list of companies that have
filed self-certification letters. The FTC intervenes against unfair or deceptive
practices, within its powers of consumer protection according to Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The FTC is committed to review, on a priority
basis, all referrals from EU Member State authorities. Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1914) [hereinafter Federal Trade Commission Act] (detailing
prohibition of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”).
53 Companies must also identify in their publicly available privacy policy
that they adhere to the Principles and comply with them. By late September 2013,
the Safe Harbor agreement had a membership of 3,246 companies. See European
Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 2 (answering questions regarding “actions to
be taken to restore trust in data flows between the EU and the U.S.”).
54 Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 52, § 5 (detailing prohibition of
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”).
55 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and
Companies Established in the EU, at 5, COM (2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013)
[hereinafter Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_847_en.pdf (“51%
are firms that process data of employees in Europe transferred to the US for
human resource purposes.”).
56 Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 52, § 5 (prohibiting unfair and
deceptive acts or another law or regulation prohibiting such acts).
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about the purposes for which it collects and uses information about
them.57 An organization must offer individuals the opportunity to
choose whether their personal information is to be disclosed to a
third party or to be used for a purpose that is incompatible with
the purposes for which it was originally collected or subsequently
authorized. 58
Where an organization wishes to transfer
information to a third party that is acting as an agent, it may do so
if it first ascertains that the third party subscribes to the Principles
or is subject to the Directive or another adequacy finding, or enters
in agreement with third parties requiring that they provide at least
the same level of privacy protection. 59 Organizations creating,
maintaining, using or disseminating personal information must
take reasonable precautions to protect it from loss, misuse and
unauthorized access, disclosure alteration and destruction.
Information must be relevant for the purposes for which it is used
and individuals must have access at each moment and the possibility
to correct it. 60 And effective privacy protection must include
mechanisms for assuring compliance with the Principles, as well as
recourse for individuals to whom the data relate affected by noncompliance with the principles. 61 The Safe Harbor agreement
follows the EU definition of personal data saying that it concerns
“data about an identified or identifiable individual that are within
the scope of the Directive, received by a U.S. organization from the
European Union, and recorded in any form.”62
Following the Commission’s alert to the Department of
57 Such organizations must also inform individuals about how to contact the
organization with any inquiries or complaints, the types of third parties to which
it discloses the information, and the choices and means the organization offers
individuals for limiting its use and disclosure. See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles,
supra note 5.
58 In case of sensitive personal information specifying medical or health
conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade union membership or information specifying the sex life of the
individual, individuals must be given affirmative or explicit choice if the
information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than
those for which it was originally collected or subsequently authorized by the
individual through the exercise of opt in choice. See id.
59 Id.
60
Id.
61 Id.
62 See Safe Harbor Decision, supra note 51, at Annex I (delineating the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles and detailing the requirement that transfers of personal
data take place only to non-EU countries that provide an “adequate” level of
privacy protection).
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Commerce, the latter made it mandatory since March 2013 for a
Safe Harbor company to make their privacy policy for
customer/user data readily available on their public website.63 For
the Commission, the Department of Commerce must actively
follow up on the effective incorporation of the Safe Harbor
principles in companies’ privacy policies rather than leave
enforcement action to the initiative of individuals’ complaints.64 In
this respect, apart from the FTC’s enforcing authority within its
powers against unfair or deceptive acts or practices in affecting
commerce, the Commission proposes that organizations must
commit to cooperating with the EU Data Protection Panel. 65
Further, Article 29 Working Party found insufficiencies in the
63 Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55, at 7
(discussing the requirement of transparency of companies’ privacy policies under
the Safe Harbor). They are also required to identify on their website an
Alternative Dispute Resolution provider and to include a link to the Safe Harbor
self-certification on the website of the Department of Commerce. Id. at 8.
According to estimates, over thirty percent of the Safe Harbor members do not
provide dispute resolution information in the privacy policies on their websites,
citing Chris Connolly’s (Galexia) appearance before the European Parliament
LIBE Committee inquiry on 7 Oct. 2013. Id. at 7. According to the European
Commission, up to ten percent of the certified companies have not fully complied
with the requirement to post a privacy policy containing the Safe Harbor
statement on their websites, while another ten percent post false claims of safe
Harbor adherence. Id. About ten percent of companies claiming membership in
the Safe Harbor are not listed by the Department of Commerce as current
members of the scheme, which is due either to failure to resubmit their
certification annually or to not having self-certified in the first place. Id. The
Commission has also found that many privacy policies of self-certified companies
are unclear as regards the purposes for which data are collected, and the right to
choose whether or not it will be disclosed to third parties, raising issues of
compliance with the principles of “Notice” and “Choice.” Id. at 9. In parallel, the
Department of Commerce does not maintain an updated list of the companies
who are indeed adhering to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles. Id.
64 Id. at 9 (noting that the incorporation of the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles
is not “sufficiently ensured”).
65 This is a body competent for investigating and resolving complaints
lodged by individuals for alleged infringement of the Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles by a U.S. company member. Companies that self-certify must choose to
comply with independent recourse mechanism or to cooperate with the EU Data
Protection Panel in order to remedy problems arising out of failure to comply
with Safe Harbor Privacy Principles. Cooperation with the EU Data Protection
Panel is mandatory when the U.S. company processes human resources personal
data transferred from the EU in the context of an employment relationship. If the
company commits itself to cooperate with the EU panel, it must also commit itself
to comply with any advice given by the EU where it takes the view that the
company needs to take specific action to comply with the Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles including remedial or compensatory measures.
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absence of a public body which would enforce the Safe Harbor
principles, as the FTC has only limited powers which do not
include sectors such as financial services (banks and insurance),
telecommunications, transportation, employment relationships and
non-profit activities.66
Under the Safe Harbor Agreement, the EU national Data
Protection Authorities have the right to suspend data transfers to
Safe Harbor certified companies in specific cases.67 Independent
from the powers they have under the Safe Harbor decision, EU
national Data Protection Authorities also have powers distinct
from those provided by the Safe Harbor Agreement that permit
intervention in data transfers in order to assure compliance with
the general principles of data protection set forth in the 1995 Data
Protection Directive. These include the ability to intervene in the
case of international transfers.68 If a company has not joined the
Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, then in case of data flow from a
company situated in a member state of the European Union in a

66 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2000 on the Level of
Protection Provided by the “Safe Harbor Principles” 1, 3, WP 32 (May 16, 2000),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2000/wp32_en.pdf
(noting
that safe harbor benefits only apply to organizations that are subject to FTC-type
jurisdiction). Enforcement of the principles would rely either on Alternative
Dispute Resolution or on the injunctive powers of the Federal Trade Commission
which were not found to be satisfactory either as the bridge between the two
layers is uncertain: the ADR bodies should notify to the FTC cases of failure to
comply, but there is no obligation for them to do so. Id. at 7. The powers of the
FTC are discretionary, which means that although the individuals concerned can
file a complaint, there is no guarantee that the FTC will examine their case, and
individuals do not have a right to be heard before the FTC, neither to enforce the
ADR bodies’ decisions nor to challenge them or the lack thereof. This means that
individuals concerned by an alleged violation of the principles would not be
assured of the right to stand before an independent instance. Id. at 7.
67 “[S]uspension of transfers can be required in two situations, where: (a) the
government body in the U.S. has determined that the company is violating the
Safe Harbor Privacy Principles; or (b) there is a substantial likelihood that the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles are being violated; there is a reasonable basis for
believing that the enforcement mechanism concerned is not taking or will not take
adequate and timely steps to settle the case at issue; the continuing transfer would
create an imminent risk of grave harm to data subjects; and the competent
authorities in the Member State have made reasonable efforts under the
circumstances to provide the company with notice and an opportunity to
respond.” Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55, at 4
n.12.
68 Id. at 4 (noting that EU national data protection authorities are competent
to intervene, even in the case of international transfers, to ensure compliance).
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parent company in the United States, the exporter based in the EU
must go through the proceedings laid down in the EU Member
state where the company is situated.69 The European Commission
can adapt the decision, suspend it, or limit its scope at any time in
light of its implementation,70 especially if there is a systemic failure
on the U.S. side, if a body responsible for ensuring compliance
with the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles in the United States is not
fulfilling its role, or if the level of protection provided by the Safe
Harbor is overtaken by the requirements of U.S. legislation. 71
Following the revelations on U.S. surveillance programs, German
Data Protection Authority (“DPA”) went further, expressing
concerns that there may be violations of the principles in the
Id. at 5.
See Regulation 182/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 55) 13 (setting out the examination
procedure).
71 Gaps in transparency or in enforcement on the U.S. side due to the
voluntary adherence of these companies, result in responsibility being shifted to
European Data Protection authorities and to the companies, which use the
scheme. See, e.g., Düsseldorfer Kreis decision of 28/29 (Apr. 2010) and Beschluss
der obersten Aufsichtsbehörden für den Datenschutz im nicht-öffentlichen
Bereich
am
28/29
(Apr.
2010),
available
at
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Entschliessungssammlun
g/DuesseldorferKreis/290410_SafeHarbor.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
(expounding on decisions by German data protection authorities requesting
companies transferring data from Europe to the U.S. to actively check that
companies in the U.S. importing data comply with Safe Harbor Privacy Principles
and recommending that at least the exporting company must determine whether
the Safe Harbor Certification by the importer is still valid).
However, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Peter Hustinx
expressed an opinion at the European Parliament LIEBE Committee Inquiry on
October 7, 2013 that “substantial improvements have been made and most issues
now been settled” as far as Safe Harbor is concerned. Peter Hustinx, LIBE
Committee Inquiry on Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens (Oct. 7, 2013),
available
at
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Docum
ents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2013/13-10-07_Speech_LIBE_PH_EN.pdf.
Past similar cases include the French CNIL finding in 2012 that Google provides
insufficient information to its users on its personal data processing operations.
Press Release, CNIL, Google’s New Privacy Policy: Incomplete Information and
Uncontrolled
Combination
of
Data
Across
Services,
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/article29/documentation/otherdocument/files/2012/20121016_press
_release_google_privacy_cnil_en.pdf (stating that “Google does not provide user
control over the combination of data across its numerous services” and “Google
does not provide retention periods”).
69
70
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Commission’s decisions and requested that companies transferring
personal data to U.S. providers inform the DPA on whether and
how the concerned providers can prevent access by the NSA.72
All companies involved in the PRISM program that grant access
to U.S. authorities to data stored and processed in the U.S. are Safe
Harbor certified. The national security exception means that
information obtained in violation of the Safe Harbor Agreement
and transferred to the State authorities that conduct surveillance is
not protected and the individual has no right whatsoever to it.
Under the existing agreements, the Safe Harbor is not protective
enough. The current Safe Harbor Agreement cannot survive under
the new regulation proposed by the Commission, which is
currently under deliberation.73 If, under the new regulation (once
it is enacted), the Safe Harbor provisions are amended to be
compatible with the regulation, then there is a possibility that
protection may be more efficient. The EU Regulation raises the
standards of protection to a point, which must either force the
renegotiation of the Safe Harbor and other agreements or is bound
to be unenforceable. 74 Moreover, the Safe Harbor focuses
essentially on notice and choice of the data and contains very few
provisions prohibiting the acquisition and retention of data

72 See Conference of Data Protection Commissioners Says that Intelligence Services
Constitute a Massive Threat to Data Traffic Between Germany and Countries Outside
Europe,
DIE BUNDESBEAUFTRAGTE FÜR DEN DATENSCHUTZ UND DIE
INFORMATIONSFREIHEIT
(July
24,
2003),
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/Home/homepage_Kurzmeldungen/PMDSK_Saf
eHarbor.html?nn=408870 (discussing a resolution of a German Conference of data
protection commissioners with regard to Internet traffic between companies in
Germany and countries outside of Europe). The Irish and Luxembourg DPAs
have not found an absence of compliance in complaints that reference the Safe
Harbor agreement or violation of their national data protection laws. See David
Meyer, Privacy Campaigners Lose Luxembourg Bid to Censure Microsoft over
NSA
Links
(Nov.
18,
2013,
4:36
AM),
available
at
https://gigaom.com/2013/11/18/privacy-campaigners-lose-luxembourg-bid-tocensure-microsoft-over-nsa-links/ (discussing a statement from the National
Commission for Data Protection finding that Microsoft’s data transfer from
Europe to the U.S. did not break EU privacy law). The Irish High Court has
granted an application for judicial review on the inaction of the Irish Data
Protection Commissioner following a complaint by a student group. See
Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55 (discussing that
the Irish DPA declined to investigate two complaints referencing the Safe Harbor
program, one of which was filed by a student group, Europe v. Facebook (EvF),
who had also filed other complaints).
73 See infra Part 3.1.
74 See infra Part 3.1.
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altogether, which is imposed under the new regulation.75
The European Commission is trying, through interpretation, to
limit the scope of the national security exception in the
transatlantic flow of data,76 pointing out that this exception as a
limitation of a fundamental right must be narrowly construed, set
forth in a publicly accessible law and necessary and proportionate
in a democratic society.77 Under current U.S. legislation, “there are
no opportunities for either EU or US data subjects to obtain access,
rectification or erasure of data, or administrative or judicial redress
with regard to collection and further processing of their personal
data taking place under the US surveillance programmes.” 78
Further, companies do not systematically indicate in their privacy
policies when they apply exceptions to the principles. Individuals
and companies are not aware of what is being done with their data.
The Commission also recommends that the privacy policies of selfcertified companies should include information on the extent to
which U.S. law allows public authorities to collect and process data
transferred under the Safe Harbor.79
See infra Part 3.1.
See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, supra note 5 (existing also in the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles as well as Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995, mentioned throughout the
paper, as well as the proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council).
77 See Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55, at 19.
The wording of the national security exceptions is that limitations are allowed
only “to the extent necessary” to meet national security, public interest, or law
enforcement requirements.” Safe Harbor Decision, supra note 51, at annex I. The
Commission also requires to be notified by the Department of any statute or
government regulations that would affect adherence to the Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles, while it stresses that the use of exceptions should be carefully
monitored and the exceptions must not be used in a way that undermines the
protection afforded by the Principles. See Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party, Opinion 4/2000 on the Level of Protection Provided by the “Safe Harbor
Principles,” EUR. COMM’N, WP 32 (May 16, 2000) [hereinafter Article 29 Working
Party Opinion 4/2000]; see also Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council: Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows, at 11, COM (2013)
846 final (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Rebuilding Trust], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_846_en.pdf.
78 Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55, § 7.2, at
17.
79 This means that companies should be encouraged to indicate in their
privacy policies when they apply exceptions to the Principles to meet national
security, public interest or law enforcement requirements and stresses that the
exception must be used only to an extent that is strictly necessary or
proportionate. The Commission’s concern, however, is limited to imposing a
75
76
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2. DATA COLLECTION AND THE U.S. AUTHORITIES UNDER THE U.S.
PATRIOT ACT

2.1. Surveillance Within the U.S.
According to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, any
government agency seeking to use electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes inside the United States must obtain
a warrant 80 from a special court, the Foreign Intelligence
The warrant may be issued upon
Surveillance Court. 81
government proof of “probable cause to believe that the target of
the electronic surveillance” is an agent of a foreign power.82 FISA
imposes “minimization” procedures to protect the privacy rights of
individuals who are not “targets” of FISA surveillance, but whose
conversations or personal information are incidentally picked up in
the course of electronic surveillance of legitimate targets under the

duty to the private actors who are collecting data that they may be obligated to
disclose to certain authorities or other third parties. “For example, Nokia, which
has operations in the U.S. and is a Safe Harbor member[,] provides [the] following
notice in its privacy policy: ’We may be obligated by mandatory law to disclose
your personal data to certain authorities or other third parties, for example, to law
enforcement agencies in the countries where we or third parties acting on our
behalf operate.’” European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 5.
80 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1863 (1978).
81 Established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) consisted initially of seven, and
now eleven, federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States to
serve staggered terms on the FISC. Id. § 1822.
82 Id. § 1805. FISA requires the Attorney General to approve all applications
for FISA warrants, to report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees
every six months on the FISA process and the results of FISA-authorized
surveillance, and to make an annual report to Congress and the public about the
total number of applications made for FISA warrants and the total number of
applications granted, modified, or denied. Id. § 1802. It expressly provides that
no United States citizen or legal resident of the United States may be targeted for
surveillance under FISA “solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Id. § 1805. FISA requires
the use of “minimization” procedures to protect the privacy rights of individuals
who are not “targets” of FISA surveillance but whose conversations or personal
information are incidentally picked up in the course of electronic surveillance of
legitimate targets under the Act. Id.
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Act.83 Congress progressively extended the application of the FISA
to pen register and trap-and-trace orders,84 and to limited forms of
business records, including documents kept by common carriers,
public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle
rental facilities.85
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 empowered the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court to order the release of “any tangible
thing,” including historical and transactional information relating
to telephone calls and emails, financial information and consumer
credit information, to the FBI.86 The first requirement is that this
information is relevant to “an investigation to obtain foreign
intelligence information not concerning a United States person or
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities, provided that such investigation of a United States
person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities
protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.”87 The term
“tangible things” may refer to any objects, or databases, library
records and Internet browsing histories.88 Phone records are to be
collected containing subscriber information, toll billing records
information or electronic communication transactional records,89 as
well as financial records. The second requirement is a statement of
fact by the FBI proving that “there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an
authorized investigation”90 under the Act.91
83
Minimization procedures govern the implementation of electronic
surveillance to ensure that such implementation conforms to its authorized
purpose. Id. § 1801. The procedures are adopted by the Attorney General and
reviewed by the FISA Court. Id.
84 This enables the government to obtain lists of the telephone numbers and
e-mails contacted by an individual after the issuance of the order. 50 U.S.C. § 1842
(2008) (allowing access to pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign
intelligence and international terrorism investigations).
85 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2001) (allowing access to certain business records).
86 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as 50
U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1)(2012)).
87 Id.
88 Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 8.
89 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (a).
90 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 86, at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(a).
91 See id. § 1861 (c)(2)(D). To obtain a section 215 order, the U.S. Government
must show that the item sought must be able to be “obtained with a subpoena
duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury
investigation or with any other order issued by a court of the United States
directing the production of records or tangible things.” Id.; see also ACLU v.
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The Act authorizes the issuance of National Security Letters, a
form of administrative subpoenas by which the FBI can obtain
access to this material. 92 They are primarily used to obtain
telephone toll records, e-mail subscriber information, and banking
and credit card records.93 Access to these records is allowed even if
the subject is not a suspect in the investigation: under the Patriot
Act, the FBI can issue an NSL when an authorized FBI official
certifies that the records sought are “relevant to an authorized
investigation.”94 The legality of these orders may be challenged by
filing a petition within a year of their issuance. 95 Financial
institutions are obliged to comply with a request for a customer’s
financial records when the authorities testify that the records are
Statutes
sought for foreign counterintelligence purposes. 96
authorizing National Security Letters include the Right to Financial
Privacy Act,97 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,98 and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.99 For issuance of these letters, the
requirement is “information or allegation” indicating that a threat
to national security may occur, but not an “articulable factual
basis” required by full FBI investigations.100 This information can
be kept for thirty years after the investigation’s closure. 101 The
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Read in harmony, the Stored
Communications Act does not limit the Government’s ability to obtain
information from communications providers under section 215 because section
215 orders are functionally equivalent to grand jury subpoenas.”).
92 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (a).
93 Id.; 12 USC § 3414 (allowing the FBI to gain access to records in financial
institutions for purposes of foreign counterintelligence). Although initially used
sparingly, in 2012 “the FBI issued 21,000 NSLs . . . primarily for subscriber
information.” LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 90 (Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter LIBERTY REPORT],
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-1212_rg_final_report.pdf.
94 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1).
95 USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (f)(2)(A)(i).
96 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A).
97 12 U.S.C. § 3401.
98 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
99 18 U.S.C. § 2709.
100 John Ashcroft, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Attorney General’s Guidelines on
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations
21–22, § VI.A., B. (2002) [hereinafter Ashcroft Guidelines].
101 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S
USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND
EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006, 68 n.41 (Mar. 2008) [hereinafter 2008 OIG
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statute allowing disclosure of a full credit report contains no
limitations on dissemination. The financial and communications
NSL statutes refer to the Attorney General Guidelines, which allow
sharing with law enforcement agencies, the intelligence
Community and foreign governments.102 NSL derived information
is uploaded into the Investigative Data Warehouse, and is likely to
be available to the National Counterterrorism Center.
The Supreme Court has held that the “Fourth Amendment was
not intended to interfere with the power of the courts to compel,
through a subpoena the production” of evidence as long as the
order compelling the production of records or other tangible
objects meets the general test of “reasonableness.”103 Section 215 of
the U.S. Patriot Act extends the principle of subpoena from the
criminal investigation into the realm of foreign intelligence.
Section 215 is based upon Supreme Court decisions, which held
that individuals have no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in
information they voluntarily share with third parties such as banks
and telephone companies.104 The philosophy behind this ruling is
that what a person knowingly exposes to third parties is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.105 The Court applied this
reasoning to bank records 106 and to an individual’s telephone
calling records.107 The Financial Privacy Act generally prohibited
financial institutions from recording personal financial records and
REPORT], available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0803b/final.pdf (“The
length of time that the FBI retains investigative information . . . depends on
several factors . . . . In general, information related to intelligence investigations is
retained in the FBI’s files . . . for 30 years after a case is closed, and information
related to criminal investigations is retained for 20 years after a case is closed.”).
102 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(B) (2013) (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation may
disseminate information obtained pursuant to this paragraph only as provided in
guidelines approved by the Attorney General for foreign intelligence collection
and foreign counter-intelligence investigations . . . . “); 18 U.S.C. § 2709(d) (2013)
(“The Federal Bureau of Investigation may disseminate information and records
obtained under this section only as provided in guidelines approved by the
Attorney General . . . . “); MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 37, 41, § II (2008)
[hereinafter
MUKASEY
GUIDELINES],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf (providing guidelines
for domestic FBI investigations).
103 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
104 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
105 I am grateful to David Cole for this interpretation.
106 Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1976).
107 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
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it expressly authorized them to disclose such records in response to
lawful subpoenas and search warrants.108
The idea of separate spheres of privacy 109 that are not
necessarily overlapping and are under the control of the individual
is missing in U.S. law. According to this idea, if an individual
consents to the use of some of her data by a private company,
bank, credit card company, Internet service provider, telephone
company, health-care provider, etc., this does not necessarily mean
that she consents to further use of this data by other actors. The
individual must retain the right to define and redefine at every
moment who has access to what kind of information that concerns
her.
In 2012, the Supreme Court held that long-term surveillance of
an individual’s location, effected by attaching a GPS device to his
car, constituted a trespass and therefore, a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.110 Five Justices suggested that
the surveillance might have infringed on the driver’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy,” even if there had been no technical
trespass and even though an individual’s movements in public are
voluntarily exposed to third parties. 111 A recent FISC opinion
recognized that the “Supreme Court may someday revisit the
third-party disclosure principle in the context of twenty-first
century communications technology, but that day has not arrived.
Accordingly, Smith remains controlling with respect to the
acquisition by the government from service providers of noncontent telephony metadata . . . .”112 In another opinion of the
108 Right to Financial Privacy Act, § 1114, Pub. L. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3707
(codified at 12 U.S.C. 3414) (1978).
109 For a general analysis, see FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND
SOCIAL FREEDOM (1992) (discussing the assumption in moral philosophy that
social control is an intellectually and morally destructive source).
110 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–51 (2012).
111 Justice Sonia Sotomayor observed in her concurring opinion that

it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties . . . . This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks . . . . I would not
assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to [others] for a limited
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
protection.
Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (citations omitted).
112 In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order
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same Court, the Court determined that the bulk telephony
metadata program meets “the low statutory hurdle set out in
Section 215.”113
The phone metadata collected pursuant to Section 215 of the
Patriot Act is retained for five years, unless it is responsive to
authorized queries, and is thus retained pursuant to the
procedures of the agency holding the information, e.g. the NSA or
another agency such as the FBI with whom the NSA shared the
data.114 Similarly concerning onward transfers and sharing of data
collected under Section 215, the orders for the production or
telephony metadata among other requirements, prohibit the
sharing of the raw data and permit the NSA to share with other
agencies only data that are responsive to authorized queries for
counterterrorism.115
The FISC has imposed limitations on the use of this metadata.
The current program acquires a large amount of telephony
metadata each day, which represents only a small percentage of
the total telephony metadata held by service providers. 116 The
FISC orders defining the use of this data prohibited the
government from accessing the metadata for any purpose other
than to obtain foreign intelligence information.117 The FISA court
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted version], Docket No.
BR 13-158 (FISC Oct. 11, 2013), pp. 5–6.
113 In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted version], Docket No.
BR 13-109 (FISC Aug. 29, 2013), p. 22.
114 MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 102. The guidelines provide that any
information obtained will be kept in accordance with a records retention plan
approved by the National Archives and Records Administration. The latter does
not establish specific retention periods, providing instead that records should be
deleted or destroyed when the agency determines they are no longer needed for
administrative, legal, audit or other operational purposes. Id.
115 Id. at 8. The Attorney General’s guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations
also provide that the FBI may disseminate collected personal information to other
U.S. intelligence agencies as well as to law enforcement authorities of the
executive branch for a number of reasons or on the basis of other statutes and
legal authorities.
116 A similar metadata program for Internet communications under the
authority of FISA’s pen register and trap-and-trace provisions (rather than the
authority of section 215) was suspended, for operational and technical reasons,
and because the program was insufficiently productive to justify the cost. See
LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 97.
117 Access to this data is allowed only when there are facts giving rise to a
“reasonable, articulable suspicion” that the selection term to be queried “is
associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization,” a finding which is made
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does not review or approve individual queries either in advance or
after the fact. It sets only the criteria for queries and receives
reports every thirty days from the NSA concerning the number of
identifiers used to query the metadata and the results of these
queries.118 While the FISC requires that the “reasonable, articulable
suspicion” requirement be met, the NSA does not have to go back
to the Court to justify particular queries, deciding itself whether
this requirement is met. 119 While the administration has
emphasized that only 300 identifiers were used to query the data
during 2012, the NSA has acknowledged that it can obtain
additional phone numbers that are up to three “hops” out from the
original number.120 These hops refer to the number of connections
from the original number: the first “hop” is to phone numbers the
original number is in contact with, the second is numbers in
contact with the first “hop” numbers, and the third is the numbers
in contact with those “second hop” numbers.121 While the agency
may not run a three-hop analysis on every contact, a decision to do
so gives it access to the phone records of millions.
2.2. Surveillance Outside the U.S.
The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 2008
adopted different rules for international communications
depending on whether the target of the surveillance was a “United
States person” (a category including both American citizens and
non-citizens who are legal permanent residents of the United
States)122 or a “non United States person.”123 According to Section
by one of twenty-two specially trained persons. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER:
BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA
PATRIOT
ACT
3
(2013)
[hereinafter
WHITE
PAPER],
available
at
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/750211-administration-whitepaper-section-215.html; see also LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 98 (discussing
recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies).
118 Id. at 100.
119 Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 46.
120 WHITE PAPER, supra note 117, at 4.
121 Id. at 3–4.
122 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i).
’United States person’ means a citizen of the United States, an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101
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702 of the FISA Amendments Act (“FAA”), if the target of foreign
intelligence surveillance is a non-United States person who is
“reasonably believed to be located outside the United States,” the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may
authorize surveillance upon the issuance of an order from the FISC
without showing a probable cause to believe that the target is an
agent of a foreign power, even if the interception takes place inside
the U.S. 124 Section 702 authorized the FISC to approve annual
(a)(20) of Title 8), an unincorporated association, a substantial number of
members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is
incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or
an association which is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1),
(2), or (3) of this section.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(i).
123 LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 135.
[I]f the target of the surveillance is a United States person, the same FISA
procedures apply—without regard to whether the target is inside or
outside the United States. . . . [This means that] surveillance is
permissible only if it is intended to acquire foreign intelligence
information and the FISC issues a warrant based on a finding that there
is probable cause to believe that the United States person is an agent of a
foreign power, within the meaning of FISA.
Id. See also 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).
124 Id. An electronic communication service provider receiving a directive
from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may file a
petition to modify or set aside such directive with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(A). Section 1881a mandates that the
Government obtain the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s approval of
targeting and minimization procedures, and a governmental certification
regarding proposed surveillance. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e).
Among other things, the Government’s certification must attest that (1)
procedures are in place “that have been approved, have been submitted for
approval, or will be submitted with the certification for approval by the [FISC]
that are reasonably designed to ensure that an acquisition . . . is limited to
targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;” (2)
minimization procedures adequately restrict the “acquisition, retention, and
dissemination of nonpublic information about non-consenting U.S. persons,” as
appropriate; (3) “guidelines have been adopted . . . to ensure compliance with”
targeting limits and the Fourth Amendment; and (4) the procedures and
guidelines referred to above comport with the Fourth Amendment. 50 U.S.C. §
1881a(g)(2); Legal Standards for the Intelligence Community in Conducting Electronic
Surveillance, FED. OF AM. SCI. (2000), http://fas.org/irp/nsa/standards.html; 50
U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1)(A). The FISC assesses whether the targeting procedures are
“reasonably designed” (1) to “ensure that any acquisition . . . is limited to
targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;”
and (2) to “prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which
the sender and all intended recipients are known . . . to be located in the United
States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1)(A); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1)(B).
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certifications submitted by the Attorney General and the Director
of National Intelligence (“DNI”) that identify certain categories of
foreign intelligence targets whose communications may then be
collected, subject to FISC-approved targeting and minimization
procedures. 125 The NSA determines which individuals to target
pursuant to FISC-approved certifications, but the Government is
not obliged to “describe to the court each specific target and
identify each facility at which its surveillance would be directed,
thus permitting surveillance on a programmatic, not necessarily
individualized basis.”126 The NSA, on the basis of some identifiers
(e-mail addresses or telephone numbers) that it reasonably believes
are being used by non-U.S. persons located outside of the U.S. to
communicate foreign intelligence information within the scope of
the approved categories, then acquires the content of telephone
calls, e-mails, text messages, photographs, and other Internet traffic
using those identifiers from service providers in the U.S.127
Section 702 requires that NSA’s certifications attest that[:]
[1] “a ‘significant purpose’ of any acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information . . . directed at international
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, or hostile cyber activities[;]
[2] that [the acquisition] does not intentionally target a
United States person[;] [3] that it does not intentionally
target any person known at the time of acquisition to be in
the United States[;] [4] that it does not target any person
outside the United States for the purpose of targeting a
person inside the United States[;] and [5] that it meets the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.128
The FISC held in one instance 129 that the minimization
procedures that applied to NSA’s upstream collection of electronic
communications did not meet the requirements of FISA or the
Fourth Amendment, as the NSA’s use of upstream collection often
LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 136.
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g); see Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138,
1156 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing Government’s permitting of
surveillance on a programmatic basis).
127 LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 136.
128 Id. at 136–37.
129 In re DNI/AG 702(g), Docket Number 702(i)-11-01, at 17, n.15 (FISC Oct.
3, 2011) [hereinafter FISC Oct. 3, 2011 Opinion].
125
126
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involves the inadvertent acquisition of multi-communication
transactions (“MCTs”), 130 many of which do not fall within the
parameters of section 702. Thus the government’s revelations
regarding the scope of NSA’s upstream collection implicate 50
U.S.C. § 1809(a), which makes it a crime to “engage in electronic
surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute . . .
.” 131 For the Court, “[t]he fact that NSA’s technical measures
cannot prevent NSA from acquiring transactions containing wholly
domestic communications . . . does not render NSA’s acquisition of
those transactions ‘unintentional.’” 132 Thus, due to the broad
method of collection and technical reasons, personal data is
collected that may not be relevant to foreign intelligence.
Section 702 affords United States persons the same protection
against foreign intelligence surveillance when they are outside the
United States as the FISA affords them when they are inside the
country’s borders. A United States person may not lawfully be
targeted for foreign intelligence surveillance unless the FISC issues
a warrant based on a finding that there is probable cause to believe
that the targeted United States person is an agent of a foreign
power. 133 Section 702 also has an impact on the privacy of
communications of United States persons due to the risk of
inadvertent interception. When incidental acquisition occurs in the
130 MCTs arise when many communications are bundled together within a
single Internet transmission, resulting in a situation where the lawful interception
of one communication in the bundle requires in the interception of them all.
131 FISC Oct. 3, 2011 Opinion, supra note 129.

NSA’s upstream Internet collection devices are generally incapable of
distinguishing between transactions containing only a single discrete
communication to, from, or about a tasked selector and transactions
containing only a single discrete communication to, from or about a
tasked selector and transactions containing multiple discrete
communications, not all of which may be to, from, or about a tasked
selector. . . . The sheer volume of transactions acquired by NSA through
its upstream collection is such that any meaningful review of the entire
body of the transactions is not feasible.
Id. at 31 (citations omitted). What is more,
Internet service providers are constantly changing their protocols and
the services they provide, and often give users the ability to customize
how they use a particular service . . . . As a result, it is impossible to
define with any specificity the universe of transactions that will be
acquired by NSA’s upstream collection at any point in the future.
Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
132 Id. at 45.
133 LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 146.
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course of Section 702 surveillance, existing minimization
procedures require that any intercepted communication with a
United States person, and any information obtained about a United
States person, must be destroyed unless it has foreign intelligence
value.134
As the Committee of Experts commissioned by the President
found, Section 702 allows the government to target foreigners
abroad under a lower standard than if the target was an American
abroad or a foreigner in the U.S. communicating with an American
in the U.S.135 It is often difficult to determine whether the e-mail
address, Internet communication, or telephone number of the nontargeted participant in a legally acquired communication belongs
to a United States person, because that information often is not
apparent on the face of the communication. Thus, there is a risk
that communications involving United States persons will not be
purged, and instead will be retained in a government database.136
Furthermore, the very concept of information of “foreign
intelligence value” is vague and can easily lead to the preservation
of private information about known United States persons whose
communications are incidentally intercepted in the course of a
legal Section 702 interception.137
FISC proceedings are non-adversarial, and there is no
representation before the FISA Court of the interests of the data
subject during the consideration of an application for an order.138
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that neither
individuals nor organizations have standing to bring a lawsuit
under Section 702 because they cannot know whether they have
been subject to surveillance or not.139 The orders of the FISC are
134 NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED, § 5(1) (2011).
135 LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 148 (arguing that the current approach
does not adequately protect the privacy of United States persons whose
communications are incidentally acquired).
136 Id. at 149.
137 Id.
138 EUR. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE FINDINGS BY THE EU CO-CHAIRS OF THE AD
HOC EU-US WORKING GROUP ON DATA PROTECTION 16, (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter
AD
HOC
EU-U.S.
WORKING
GROUP
REPORT],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoceu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf.
139 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
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classified, and companies are required to maintain secrecy
regarding the assistance they are required to provide, which means
that there are no avenues, judicial or administrative, for either U.S.
or EU data subjects to be informed of whether their personal data
is being collected or further processed. 140 There are thus no
opportunities for individuals to obtain access, rectification or
erasure of data, or administrative or judicial redress.141 Although
“there is judicial oversight for activities that imply a capacity to
compel information[,] . . . [t]here is no judicial approval of
individual selectors to query the data collected under Section 215
or tasked for collection under section 702.”142 The FISC operates ex
parte, and in camera, issuing classified opinions unless they are
declassified.143
From the European point of view, the program under Section
702 violates the principle of reciprocity. As the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament notes, although the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to nonU.S. citizens, the European legal framework does not discriminate
on the basis of citizenship for the rights that it protects, among
which is the right to privacy.144
dissenting) (holding that Amnesty International did not have standing to
challenge Section 702).
140 AD HOC EU-U.S. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 138, at 17.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 18.
143 Id.
144 See Working Document on Mass Surveillance, supra note 12, at 2; see also
LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 156–57 (outlining three proposals by the
Committee commissioned by the President that are not fully satisfactory from the
European point of view). The Committee suggests that there should be “three
primary differences between the standards governing the acquisition of
communications of United States persons and non-United States persons” which
are warranted by the special obligation the U.S. government owes to its people:
First, United States persons [should] be targeted only upon a showing of
probable cause, whereas non-United States persons [should] be targeted
upon a showing of reasonable belief. Second, United States persons
[should] be targeted only if there is a judicial warrant from the FISC
whereas non-United States persons [should] be targeted without . . .
warrant, but with careful after-the-fact review and oversight. Third, the
minimization requirements for communications of United States persons
would not extend fully to non-United States persons located outside the
United States, but importantly, information collected about such persons
[should] not be disseminated unless it is relevant to the national security
of the United States or [its] allies.
Id.
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The Committee on Foreign Affairs also recommends that in the
absence of a specific and compelling showing, the U.S. government
should follow the model of the Department of Homeland Security
and apply the Privacy Act of 1974 in the same way to both U.S. and
non-U.S. persons.145 The Privacy Act of 1974 provides what are
known as “privacy fair information practices” for systems of
records held by federal agencies.146 These practices are designed to
safeguard personal privacy, and include a set of legal requirements
meant to ensure both the accuracy and security of personally
identifiable information in a system of records.147
Presently, there are fewer safeguards for EU citizens in the U.S.,
as well as a lower threshold for the collection of their personal
145 The Privacy Act regulates the federal government’s collection, use, and
disclosure of all types of personal information. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). The law applies
to the government’s collection of all kinds of personal data concerning “education,
financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and
that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a
photograph.” Id. § 552a(a)(4). The Act is generally less protective than European
legislation on the same issues and contains many exceptions in particular for law
enforcement agencies and the CIA. Id. § 552a(j). Although the NSA does not
qualify for a general exemption, it can refer to the specific exemption for national
security records under NSA/Central Security Service Privacy Act Program, 32
C.F.R. § 322 (2006). Id. § 552a(k)(2).
146 This law provides protection analogous to the ones European nations
follow under Directive 95/46. See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American
Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV.
609, 632 (2007) (noting that the Privacy Act regulates government use of data from
“start to finish.”).
147 LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 158. According to the Privacy Policy
Guidance Memorandum of the Department of Homeland Security, the Privacy
Act must apply in the same way to both U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons. As
stated in the Memorandum, personally identifiable information (“PII”) that is
collected, used, maintained, and/or disseminated in connection with a mixed
system by DHS shall be treated as a System of Records subject to the Privacy Act
regardless of whether the information pertains to a U.S. citizen, legal permanent
resident, visitor, or alien. This means that non-U.S. persons have the right to
access their PII and the right to amend their records, absent an exemption under
the Privacy Act. Because of statutory limitations, the policy does not extend or
create a right of judicial review for non-U.S. persons. Intelligence agencies today
are covered by the Privacy Act, and are granted exemptions to accommodate their
need to protect matters that are properly classified, law-enforcement sensitive, or
investigatory in nature. The NSA has filed twenty-six systems of records notices
advising the public about data collections, including from applicants seeking
employment, contractors doing business with the agency, and in order to conduct
background investigations. Memorandum No. 2011–01 from the Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum of the Department of
Homeland Security 2 (Feb. 11, 2011).
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data.148 The procedures regarding targeting and minimization of
data collection apply only to U.S. citizens.
Similarly, the
constitutional protections of the First and Fourth Amendments do
not apply to EU citizens that do not reside in the U.S. For the
Commission, there is a lack of clarity concerning some available
U.S. legal bases for authorizing data collection, such as Executive
Order 12333, concerning the existence of other surveillance
programs, as well as limitations applicable to these programs.149
The Commission also finds that while there is a degree of oversight
by the three branches of government that applies in specific cases
including judicial oversight, for activities that imply a capacity to
compel information there is no judicial approval for how the data
collected is queried. Judges are not asked to approve the ‘selectors’
or analyze the criteria employed to examine the data and mine
usable pieces of information.150 Nor is there judicial oversight of
the collection of foreign intelligence outside the U.S., which is
conducted under the sole competency of the Executive Branch.151
As the European Commission notes, the legal framework of the
U.S. intelligence collection programs needs more transparency.
This includes interpretation by U.S. courts, as well as clarification
on the quantitative dimension of U.S. intelligence collection
programs. 152 The European Commission also requested an
extension of the safeguards available to U.S. citizens and residents
to EU citizens not residing in the U.S., an increase in the
transparency of intelligence activities, and further strengthening of
oversight.153 The European Commission further suggested that the
role of the FISC should be strengthened by “introducing remedies
for individuals . . . [which] could reduce the processing of personal
data of Europeans that are not relevant for national security
purposes.”154

148
European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 9 (noting the different
processing safeguards for EU citizens and U.S. citizens).
149
AD HOC EU-U.S. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 138, at 17.
150 Id. at 10, 18.
151 Id. at 18.
152 Id. at 7.
153 Rebuilding Trust, supra note 77, at 7.
154 See European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 7.
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3. FILLING IN THE GAPS IN THE PROTECTION
The Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union has
an explicit clause protecting personal data 155 in addition to the
clause guaranteeing respect for private and family life. 156 The
system of data protection in the EU is composed of Directives
95/46 and 2002/58 in the telecommunications sector, Regulation
45/20001 and Directive 2006/24 regarding the field of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and Framework Decision
2008/977/JHA.157 The proposed regulation, however, establishes a
stricter regime of privacy protection within the EU, harmonizing
the existing national legislation that has been used to implement
Directive 95/46.158 However, the remaining question is whether
the large scale collection and processing of personal information
under U.S. surveillance programs is necessary and proportionate to
meet the national security interests.159 If interpreted properly, this
principle of proportionality – omnipresent in the European
Convention and in article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the EU – could result in the important protection of data.
Expressing a fundamental principle of the rule of law, which is
as old as Aristotle, is universalizable.160 For Aristotle, justice was a
matter of the right proportion between two extremes, an
“intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss.” 161
155 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 52, 2000 O.J.
(C 364) 1 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights] (stating “[a]ny limitation on
the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter must be
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject
to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”).
156 Id. art. 7 (stating “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private
and family life, home and communications.”).
157 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, of November 2008 on the
Protection of Personal Data Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters, 2008 O.J. (L 350) 60.
158 Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, at 4 (harmonizing the rules
purportedly increased legal certainty and reduced impediments to global
operations).
159 Rebuilding Trust, supra note 77, at 4.
160 For Aristotle, in a world of contingence and perpetual flux, justice is a
matter of right proportion. The right proportion is defined as the intermediate
between two extremes. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1785 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
161 Id. at 1787–89. Further,
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According to the principle of proportionality, limitations to
individual freedoms must be necessary and appropriate to achieve
their function, and they must use the least intrusive instruments
possible to achieve the desired result. Since finding the right
proportion is also a matter of interpretation, the principle by itself
is dependent on the ad hoc evaluations and concerns of justices in
association with the margin of appreciation of the state – another
principle used by the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”).
3.1. New EU Regulation Strengthening the Protection of Data
Privacy in the Private Sector and the Changes It Brings
The proposed regulation has the potential to indirectly limit the
amount of information that ends up in the government’s hands by
limiting the amount of information that private actors can collect,
process, and store.162 Its clauses are so radical that it has been
criticized as carrying a potential for destabilizing the current status
quo.163 For example, it will force the Safe Harbor principles to be
redefined as principles used only for the possibility of notice and
choice, and will focus less on the amount of information retained
and processed. Although the new regulation contains a national
security exception by limiting the private information in the hands
of the private sector, it may indirectly limit the possibilities of state
surveillance.

[t]he man who acts unjustly has too much, and the man who is unjustly
treated too little, of what is good. In the case of evil the reverse is true;
for the lesser evil is reckoned a good in comparison with the greater evil,
since the lesser evil is rather to be chosen than the greater, and what is
worthy of choice is good, and what is worthier of choice a greater good.
Id. at 1786.
162 The Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) of the
European Parliament overwhelmingly backed the European Commission’s data
protection reform proposals. The LIBE vote gave a mandate to the rapporteurs to
negotiate with the Council of the EU. President Barroso underlined the
importance of the reform and called for a swift adoption before the end of this
parliamentary term. See Memorandum from the Eur. Comm’n, LIBE Committee
Vote Backs New EU Data Protection Rules (Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter LIBE
Committee Vote], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13923_en.htm.
163 Schwartz, supra note 39, at 1994.
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The Regulation develops a “right to be forgotten”164 should
a number of conditions apply and elaborates stricter requirements
before “consent” can be used as a justification for data
processing.165 The right to be forgotten is described as the right of
data subjects to have their personal data erased and no longer
processed, and to obtain from third parties the erasure of any links
to, or copies or replication of, that data:
[W]here . . . the data are no longer necessary in relation to
the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise
processed; . . . the data subject withdraws consent on
which the processing is based[;] . . . the data subject
objects to the processing of personal data; [or] the
processing of the data does not comply with this
Regulation . . . .166
As it stands, this means that if an EU national complains to a
supervising authority, the supervising authority can order and
enforce any processor to, for example, erase material that concerns
that national.167 The Court of Justice of the EU recently held that
even the operator of a search engine like Google engages in
activities that “must be classified as ‘processing’ within the
meaning of [Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46]” since the engine

164 Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, art. 17(1), at 51 (“The data subject shall
have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data relating to
them and the abstention from further dissemination of such data . . . .”).
165 Id. art. 7 (requiring, among other things, that any written consent form
must be presented to the subject independently).
166 See LIBE Committee Vote, supra note 162, at Commission Proposal, art. 17.
This right is particularly relevant when the data subject has given their consent as
a child, when not being fully aware of the risks involved by the processing, and
later wants to remove such personal data, especially on the Internet. The further
retention of the data, however, should be allowed where it is necessary for
historical, statistical and scientific research purposes; for reasons of public interest
in the area of public health; and for exercising the right of freedom of expression
when required by law, or where there is a reason to restrict the processing of the
data instead of erasing them. Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, at Proposed
Regulation Recital, 53.
167 Sam Schechner, Google Sued in Europe-Privacy Test Case, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
4,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323623304579055271398748940.h
tml (describing the privacy case brought against Google by former Formula One
racing president Max Mosley).
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collects data which it eventually makes publicly available. 168 In
exploring the Internet automatically, constantly, and systematically
in search of published information, “the operator of a search
engine ‘collects’ such data which it subsequently ‘retrieves,’
‘records,’ and ‘organises’ within the framework of its indexing
programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and, as the case may be,
‘discloses’ and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of lists of
search results.”169 The fact that the search engine operator applies
this process to both non-personal and personal data and does not
distinguish between the two is not significant for the court.170 Also
insignificant is the fact that the search engine is merely
reorganizing and displaying data that is already published
somewhere else on the Internet.171 Search engines are “controllers”
in the sense that they direct and determine the purpose and means
of that activity, and process personal data within the framework of
that activity. 172 They also play “a decisive role in the overall
dissemination of those data” as they “render[] the latter accessible
to any Internet user making a search on the basis of the data
subject’s name, including to Internet users who otherwise would
not have found the web page on which those data are
published.”173 Although publishers of websites have the option of
indicating to search engine operators that they wish specific
information published on their site to be wholly or partially
excluded, this does not mean that the operator of a search engine is
released from its responsibility for the processing of personal data
that it carries out in the context of the engine’s activity.174
Another measure that the new regulation imposes is the prior
approval of supervising authority for any processing of personal
data. 175 This means that the data protection authorities whose
168 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 317 (May 13, 2014), §
28,
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=103833.
169 Id. § 28.
170 Id.
171 Id. §§ 28–30.
172 Id. § 33.
173 Id. § 36.
174 Id. § 39.
175 Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, art. 34, § 3.4.6.2.
The European
Parliament gave its support to the Commission’s proposal to have a “one-stop
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powers also cover the public sector must be consulted for any data
collection program even in order to establish that the national
security exception applies.176 The regulation further establishes a
right to object to processing for marketing purposes 177 and the
right not to be subject to profiling.178 This is defined as automated
processing intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to
a person or his or her performance at work, economic situation,
location, health, personal preferences, reliability, or behavior for
use in targeted ads. 179 The directive predicts some exceptions,
including those related to public security, prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences of
economic or financial interest, in particular.180 However, the right
not to be subject to profiling by the private sector implies an
inability of the government to conduct data mining and obtain
data concerning an individual from the private sector.
The new regulation requires controllers and processors to
“implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to
ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by
the processing and the nature of the personal data to be
protected.” 181 The regulation empowers the state supervisory
authorities to impose administrative sanctions, which may reach
up to five percent of the annual worldwide turnover to enterprises
violating its clauses.182
The regulation defines its territorial scope as covering the
“processing of personal data in the context of the activities of a . . .
controller or a processor in the Union,” whether the processing

shop” for companies that operate in several EU countries, and for consumers who
want to complain against a company established in a country other than their
own. Companies will have to deal with a single national data protection authority
in the country where they are based. Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, Proposed
Regulation Recital, at 98.
176 See infra Part 3.3 (describing the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights, which concerns the requirements that the legislation establishing a
data collection program must meet).
177 Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, art. 19, § 2.
178 Id. art. 20, § 2.
179
Id.
180
Id. art. 21(1)(a-c).
181 Id. art. 30, § 1.
182 Id. art. 79, § 2(c) (following European Parliament’s Vote). The European
Commission’s initial proposal, before the Snowden revelations, was for fines up to
two percent of annual turnover. Id. art. 6.
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takes place in the EU or not.183 It also applies to the processing of
personal data of subjects in the EU by a controller or a processor,
not established in the EU, where the processing activities are
related to the offering of goods or services irrespective of payment
to subjects in the EU or to the monitoring of data subjects.184 On
the basis of this clause, and given the radical nature of the new
regulation, the Safe Harbor Agreement must be reformed.185 These
clauses can significantly affect the amount of information retained
by U.S. authorities, as they obtain it from the private sector
through the data mining processes.
Thus, since the EU regulations do not apply in cases of national
security, data collected in violation of the existing directive and the
proposed regulation in the EU pertaining to national security will
be appropriated by surveillance authorities. If the private sector
possesses information in violation of the EU’s existing regulation
that is handed over to the state, the individuals are not protected
by the existing regulation. The regulation should be interpreted as
allowing for sanctions on the private actors who are violating these
clauses because this is material they were not allowed to collect in
the first place. Although citizens cannot be protected against the
state, in order for the protection to make sense in the future, the
private actors should pay the penalties set forth in the regulation.186
While there are sparse U.S. state laws offering varying degrees
of security and certainty, there is no U.S. federal regulation on data
privacy protection for consumers.187 Thus, the EU Commission has
announced that once the new regulation obtains legal force, it
expects the U.S. to implement a single and coherent set of data
protection rules in order “to create a stable basis for personal data
flows between the EU and the U.S.,” considering that “[i]nter183 Id. art. 3, § 1 (following European Parliament’s Vote); see also LIBE
Committee Vote, supra note 162.
184
Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3, § 2 (following European
Parliament’s Vote); see also LIBE Committee Vote, supra note 162.
185
See also Rebuilding Trust, supra note 77, at 7. The proposed regulation
contains exceptions to the prohibition of the processing of personal data.
However, proposed regulation article 9(1), among others, notes that the
“processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest, on the basis of Union law, or Member State law which shall provide for
suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests.” Proposed
Regulation, supra note 3, art. 9, § 2(g).
186 Id. art. 9(2)(j).
187 Similarly, there is no common definition of personal information. See
supra Part 1.
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operability and a system of self-regulation is not enough. The
existence of a set of strong and enforceable data protection rules in
both the EU and U.S. would constitute a solid basis for crossborder data flows.”188
3.2. Data Retention Directive
The data retention directive aims to harmonize Member States’
data retention provisions in order to enhance protection of
These provisions dictate provider obligations
privacy. 189
concerning publicly available electronic communication services
and public communication networks, with respect to the retention
of certain data generated or processed by these providers for the
purpose of investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious
crimes.190 In this respect, the Directive operates as an exception to
the protective regime in the telecommunications sector guaranteed
by Directive 2002/58,191 complementing the principles established
by Directive 95/46. The Court of Justice of the European Union
recently ruled that the data retention directive is invalid because it
does not contain enough guarantees for the protection of data
privacy.192 In this respect, it followed the findings of the Advocate
European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 8.
Council Directive 2006/24/EC, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in
Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications
Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive
2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54, pmbl., ¶¶ 5–10 [hereinafter Council Directive
2006/24/EC].
190 See id. at 54, 56.
191 Council Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on
Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, amended by
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March
2006, and by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 November 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37.
192 Joined Cases C-293 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for
Commc’ns, Marine and Natural Res. and Kärntner Landesregierung et al., 2013
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 1 at 157 (Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Digital Rights Ireland
Ltd.],
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid
=145562.
188

189
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General of the Court of Justice, almost verbatim.193
The Directive applies to traffic and location data on legal
entities and natural persons. 194 It does not, however, apply to
electronic communications, including information derived from
using an electronic communications network. 195 It leaves the
Member States the option to define the procedures to be followed
and the conditions to be fulfilled in order to gain access to retained
data. In doing so, the Member States are required to act in
accordance with necessity and proportionality, subject to the
relevant provisions of EU Law or public international law, and in
particular the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) as
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.196 The data
to be retained is necessary to trace and identify the source of a
communication: actual telephone numbers, and the names and
addresses of subscribers or registered users that have fixed
network or mobile telephones.197 This retention practice allows for
193 Cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BvR] [German Constitutional Court] Mar.
2, 2010, 1 BvR 256/08, 2 (Ger.) (decision of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, holding that the implementing legislation did not set out appropriate
safeguards concerning data security and limitation of legitimate use of the
retained data); FRANZISKA BOEHM & MARK D. COLE, DATA RETENTION AFTER THE
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2014) (describing the
decision of the Romanian Federal Constitutional Court, which found that the
continuous limitation of the right to privacy, foreseen in the Data Retention
Directive, makes the essence of the right); PI. ÚS 24/10, 22.03.2011 [Czech
Republic Constitutional Court Judgment of Mar. 22, 2011], Data Retention in
Telecommunication Services (Czech.) (decision of the Czech Republic’s
Constitutional Court, annulling part of the Act on Electronic Communication, and
legally nullifying the obligation to retain traffic and location data and to make this
data available to competent authorities). See generally Arianna Vedaschi & Valerio
Lubello, Presentation at the Harvard Law School Roundtable: Constitutionalism
Across Borders and the Struggle Against Terrorism: Data Retention and its
Implications for the Fundamental Right to Privacy (Mar. 6–7, 2014).
194 Council Directive 2006/24/EC, supra note 189, art. 1, § 2.
195 Id.
196 Id. art. 4.
197 Id. art. 5, § 1(a)(1). Article 5, § 1(a)(2) further specifies that the user ID(s)
allocated to a person’s email address or Internet connection may be retained, as
well as the name and address of the subscriber or registered user and “the user ID
and telephone number allocated to any communication entering the public
telephone network.” Id. art. 5, §1(a)(2)(ii). The directive also covers the data
necessary to identify the destination of a communication, the numbers dialed and
re-routed, names of subscribers and users, user IDs or telephone numbers, names
and addresses of subscribers or registered users, and the user IDs of recipients for
Internet email and telephone. Id. art. 5, § 1(b). It also covers the data necessary to
identify the date, time, and duration of a communication. Id. art. 5, § 1(c). Data
necessary to identify the type of communication such as the telephone and
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information to be retained for six months to two years from the
date of the communication.198 The directive establishes conditions
of storage and access to the data,199 and makes the national Data
Protection Authorities responsible for monitoring its application
regarding the security of the stored data.200
For the Court, although the retention of data satisfies an
objective of general interest in the prevention of offenses and the
fight against terrorism, it is an interference that is not
proportionate to this legitimate objective. 201 According to the
Court, the Directive does not define the limits of the competent
national authorities’ access to the data and their subsequent use for
the purposes of prevention, detection, or criminal prosecutions.202
The Directive does not contain substantive and procedural
conditions relating to the access of the competent national
authorities to the data and to their subsequent use, limiting it to
what is strictly necessary in light of the objective pursued.203 By
not laying down clear and precise rules governing the extent of the
interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7
and 8 of the Charter, it does not provide for sufficient safeguards
as required by Article 8 of the Charter against abuse and “any
unlawful access and use of that data.”204 Finally, the Court notes
that the Directive does not require the data in question to be
retained within the European Union, with the result that the
control of compliance by the requirements of protection and
security by the data protection authorities is not fully ensured.205
The Advocate General noted that the Directive constitutes a
“particularly serious interference with the right to privacy,”206 as
Internet service used may also be retained under Article 5, § 1(d) and data
necessary to identify users’ communication equipment is covered under Article 5,
§ 1(e). Id. Information necessary to identify the location of mobile communication
equipment is covered by Article 5, § 1(f). Id.
198 Id. art. 6.
199 Id. art. 7.
200 Id. art. 9.
201 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., supra note 192.
202 Id. at 8.
203 Id. at 20 (“[The legislature] should have required a case-by-case
examination of requests for access in order to limit the data provided to what is
strictly necessary.”).
204 Id. at 18–19.
205 Id. at 26.
206 Id. ¶ 67, at 12.
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the retention of data in the hands of the private sector may lead to
its “outsourcing” with further dangers for the right to privacy207 in
violation of even the rules of Directive 2006/24. 208 This risk is
increased by the fact that the Directive does not require that data
be physically stored in the EU, which creates jurisdictional
difficulties that contribute to its potential to interfere with
privacy.209 This constitutes a “serious interference” with the right
to privacy, which is not proportionate sensu stricto to the objective
relating to the need to ensure the functioning of the internal
market.210
The European Union legislature should have made several
changes to the Directive. First, the legislature should have defined
the principles that must govern the collection of data, as this is an
exception from the guarantees laid down in the system of
protection of privacy of the existing directives.211 Second, “the EU
should have provided a more precise description than ‘serious
crime’ as an indication of the criminal activities which are capable
of justifying access of the competent national authorities to the data
collected and retained.” 212 Third, the EU should have limited
access to the data. This could have been accomplished by granting
access “if not solely to judicial authorities, at least to independent
authorities, or, failing that, by making any request for access
subject to review by the judicial authorities or independent
authorities . . . .” Fourth, the EU “should have required a case-bycase examination of requests for access in order to limit the data
provided to what is strictly necessary.” 213 Fifth, the EU should
have laid down “the principle that Member States may provide for
exceptions preventing access to retained data in certain exceptional
207 Id. at 13–14. In this instance, the Advocate General is alluding to the NSA
collection of materials through the Internet.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 13.
210 Id. at 16 (”[T]he intensity of the intervention in the area of regulation of
fundamental rights . . . is manifestly disproportionate to the objective relating to
the need to ensure the functioning of the internal market . . . .”). The principle of
proportionality in limiting freedoms is consecrated in article 52(1) of the Charter
of the European Union. Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European
Union art. 52, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389, 391.
211 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., supra note 192, at 19–20 (noting that the EU
could and should have incorporated principles concomitant with the directive,
which would have helped define the extent of the interference to privacy).
212
Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
213 Id. (footnote omitted).
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circumstances.” Sixth, and last, the EU “should have established
the principle that authorities authorised to access the data are
required, first, to erase them once their usefulness has been
exhausted” and “notify the persons concerned of that access, at
least retrospectively . . . .”214 Thus, the investigation, detection, and
prosecution of serious crime, while pursuing a legitimate objective,
allows for a disproportionate amount of time of retention. The
Advocate General found no reason to extend the data retention
period to over one year.215
3.3. Council of Europe and Barriers of Protection
The European Commission is requesting the U.S. to accede to
the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of
Individuals, “with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data . . . , as it acceded to the 2001 Convention on Cybercrime.”216
The convention states a number of principles that exist in the EU
directives and the proposed regulation. According to these
principles, data must be
(a) obtained and processed fairly and lawfully; (b) stored
for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way
incompatible with those purposes; (c) adequate, relevant
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they
are stored; (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to
date; [and] (e) preserved in a form which permits
identification of the data subjects for no longer than is
required for the purpose for which those data are stored.217
214 Id. The Advocate General also cites Framework Decision 2008/977 of the
European Parliament, which guarantees the protection of personal data processed
in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and
provides for guarantees of that kind in the context of data transmitted between
Member States.
215 Id. at 23 (distinguishing ‘present time’ with ‘historical time’ and stating
that data retention beyond one year would not be justified by any countervailing
benefits).
216 European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 8.
217 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, art. 5, Jan. 28, 1981 [hereinafter EC Treaty], available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm. The convention
prohibits processing of special categories of data, unless domestic law provides
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The convention foresees the possibility for a remedy in cases
where a processor refuses to inform a person as to whether
personal data has been stored, in cases of failure to communicate
the data, and in cases of failure to obtain rectification or erasure of
data if they have been processed contrary to the abovementioned
prohibitions.218 The treaty allows a party to prohibit, subject to
authorization, the trans-border flow of certain categories of
personal data under specific regulation if the other party does not
provide equivalent protection.219 A party may also prohibit the
transfer of the same data through the intermediary of the territory
of another party when the transfer aims to circumvent the
legislation of the party prohibiting the circulation of data. 220
Presently, the NSA massive metadata collection program meets
none of these requirements.
The ECtHR has issued a number of decisions concerning
surveillance, some of which are more promising than others. The
conditions of ordering telecommunication surveillance to intercept
the content of communications in Europe are less strict than in the
U.S., where a judicial order or a warrant is required.221 In Klass v.
appropriate safeguards. Article 6 outlaws the prohibition of personal data
revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, data
concerning health or sexual life, and data relating to criminal convictions.
218 EC Treaty, supra note 217, art. 8.
219 Id. art. 12, § 3 (a).
220 Id. art. 12, § 3 (b).
221 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2006) (noting that FISA authorizes the interception of
real time wire, oral, and electronic communications when the government
demonstrates to the FISA Court that there is probable cause to believe that the
target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power, or agent of a foreign
power, and that each of the facilities where electronic surveillance is directed or
used, or is about to be used, is by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power).
A classified executive order of the former President circumvented FISA by
authorizing a series of warrantless access to international telephone calls and
electronic communications even when one party was a U.S. person located in the
U.S. This government access developed through a public-private partnership in
which the NSA was informally arranged with top officials from
telecommunications companies to gain access to communications without
warrants or court orders. See Stephanie K. Pell, Systematic Government Access to
Private-Sector Data in the United States, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 245, 249–50 (2012)
(“Consistent with Fourth Amendment doctrine, law enforcement normally must
get a warrant in order to search and seize a laptop, desktop, or thumb drive. In
1986, Congress extended the warrant protection via statute to communications
content stored in an ECS (such as unopened email), but did not extend full
warrant protections to communications content in RCS storage.”) (footnotes
omitted). In a white paper submitted to Congress, the administration founded
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Germany, the Court held that the exclusion of judicial control in
ordering surveillance measures “does not exceed the limits of what
may be deemed necessary in a democratic society.” 222 There, the
initial control was affected by an official “qualified for judicial
office” with oversight from a Parliamentary Board and the G-10
Commission as set up by the legislation.223 The G-10 Commission
is composed of a Chairman qualified to hold a judicial office and
two independent assessors.224 For the Court, the Parliamentary
Board has a balanced membership, as government opposition is
represented and thus “able to participate in the control of the
measures ordered by the competent Minister who is responsible to
the Bundestag.”225 Because the Parliament is an extension of the
executive in Europe, this decision is not satisfactory. Unlike the
U.S. government, where frequent elections of the two chambers of
Congress allow for the coexistence of an executive with an
opposite majority in either of the chambers of congress, the nature
of many Parliaments of European states lends itself more easily to
partisan control.
The balanced membership of the Board
composed by representatives of all political parties represented in
the Parliament is not a sufficient guarantee, as politicians are not
guaranteed to operate with objectivity and independence.
Although there can be no recourse to the courts in respect to
ordering and implementing restrictive measures – meaning that a
warrant is not required to intercept a person’s communications –
the Court finds satisfactory that there are other remedies available,
such as complaining to the Commission that orders and executes
surveillance measures and to the Constitutional Court. 226
this presidential authority through his constitutional powers under Article II of
the U.S. Constitution, and through the authorization for the use of military force,
which was enacted by Congress in the immediate aftermath of September 11. See
also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the
National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006).
222 Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20–21, ¶ 56 (1978)
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57510.
223
Id.
224 Id ¶¶ 20–21, at 7–8. The above-mentioned Board of five Members of
Parliament appoints the Commission members for the current term of the
Bundestag after consultation with the Government. They are “completely
independent in the exercise of their functions and cannot be subject to
instructions.” Id.
225 Id. ¶ 56, at 20–21.
226 Id. ¶ 70, at 26 (reasoning that an individual does have some recourse if
she believes that she is under surveillance, albeit not to the courts).
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However, the Court also noted that information obtained through
secret surveillance must be destroyed “as soon as they are no
longer needed to achieve the required purpose.”227
Nevertheless, there are important legal tools in the European
Convention of Human Rights, and the methodology of its
interpretation, which if used properly can be protective. The Court
has held in a number of cases that the storage of personal data can
constitute an interference with the right to respect private life
under ECHR article 8(1) even if there is no evidence that the data
was used to the detriment of the data subject or even at all.228
With regard to data withheld by surveillance authorities, the
Court has held that surveillance of citizens is tolerable only if it is
“strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions.”229
Domestic law concerning how public authorities file information
about a citizen’s private life must be defined with sufficient
precision and must contain safeguards against abuses.230 The law
must be accessible and foreseeable to the person concerned. In
addition, it must define the kind of information that may be
recorded, the categories of people against whom surveillance
measures (such as gathering and keeping information) may be
taken, the circumstances in which such measures may be taken or
the procedure to be followed, as well as the length of time for
which the information should be kept.231
The Court has similarly held that the law must clearly indicate
the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the
domestic authorities to collect and store in the Surveillance Data
base information on persons’ private lives. 232 This discretion
Id. ¶ 52, at 19.
See Amann v. Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 201,
238 (2000) (noting that “it is sufficient for [the Court] to find that data relating to
the private life of an individual were stored by a public authority to conclude that,
in the instant case, the creation and storing of the impugned card amounted to an
interference, within the meaning of Article 8, with the applicant’s right to respect
for his private life.”). Id. ¶ 70.
229 Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 82 (2000),
¶ 47.
230 Id.
231 Id. ¶¶ 42–63 (holding that records containing information about an
individual’s life, studies, political activities, criminal record, constitutes an
invasion of private life and thus violate article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights).
232
Shimovolos v. Russia, App. No. 30194/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 16, ¶¶ 69–70
(2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105217.
227
228
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includes information coming from wire-tapping such as the
grounds for registration of a person’s name in the database, the
authorities competent to order such registration; the duration of
the measure, the precise nature of the data collected, the
procedures for storing and using the collected data, and the
existing controls and guarantees against abuse.233 The Court insists
that individuals be aware of the circumstances under which
surveillance may be ordered. Further, the Court maintains that
there be sufficient guarantees against arbitrary interference in
order for individuals to be able to obtain a remedy either at the
national level or before the Convention institutions.234 “The Court
has also accepted that an individual may, under certain conditions,
claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned by the mere
existence of secret measures or of legislation permitting secret
measures, without having to allege that such measures were in fact
applied to him.”235
In Amann v. Switzerland, the court made clear that the national
security limitations to the right to privacy, apart from being
foreseen in a law, must be necessary in a democratic society to
achieve the aim of national security.236 The legal basis must be
accessible and foreseeable.237 In Amann, the Swiss government had
ordered surveillance measures against a citizen for law
enforcement purposes. The ECtHR found that Article 1 of the
Federal Council’s Decree, that foresaw the possibility of
conducting surveillance on behalf of the federal police in the
interests of the Confederation’s internal and external security,
contained no indication “as to the persons concerned by such
measures, the circumstances in which they may be ordered, the
means to be employed or the procedures to be observed.”238 Even
Id.
Id. ¶ 68, at 15–16.
235 Association “21 Decembre 1989” v. Romania, App. No. 33810/07, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 27–28, ¶ 114 (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.
236 Amann v. Switzerland, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 201, ¶ 71, at 20 (“Such
interference breaches Article 8 unless it is ‘in accordance with the law’, pursues
one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 and, in addition, is
‘necessary in a democratic society’ to achieve those aims.”).
237 Id. ¶ 55, at 16 (“[T]he phrase ‘in accordance with the law’ implies
conditions which go beyond the existence of a legal basis in domestic law and
requires that the legal basis be ‘accessible’ and ‘foreseeable.’”).
238 Id. ¶ 58, at 17 (holding that the legal basis did not meet the foreseeability
requirement because it did not contain any appropriate indication as to the scope
and conditions of exercise of the power conferred on the Public Prosecutor’s
233
234
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if public authorities have a discretionary power in this area, a law
must “indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and conditions” of
the exercise of this power, in order to not violate the right to
privacy. 239 It is doubtful whether U.S. legislation allowing the
confiscation of any “tangible thing” leading to the mass collection
of data meets the foreseeability requirement of the law according
to the criteria of the ECtHR.
The ECtHR has also held that the collection and storage of
personal information relating to telephony metadata – that is, the
numbers dialed as well as the date and length of telephone
conversations – and e-mail and Internet usage without a person’s
knowledge, amounts to an interference with the right to respect for
that person’s private life. 240 After thus collecting the different
elements from different rulings on the topic, there can be some
Office to gather, record and store information. Furthermore, they did not specify
the conditions in which cards may be created, the procedures that have to be
followed, the information which may be stored, or the comments which might be
forbidden).
239 See, e.g., id. ¶ 62, at 18 (holding that the interference with the applicant’s
private life through intercepting his communications was not in accordance with
the law, “since Swiss law does not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and
conditions of exercise of the authorities’ discretionary power in the area under
consideration”); see also id. ¶ 80 (“[T]he creation of the impugned card by the
Public Prosecutor’s Office and the storing of it in the Confederation’s card index
amounted to interference with the applicant’s private life . . . .”). Cf. E.B. v.
Austria, App. Nos. 31913/07, 38357/07, 48098/07, 48777/07, 48779/07, Eur. Ct.
H.R.,
¶
75
(2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{"appno":["31913/07"],"i
temid":["001-127814"]} (“[T]he storing by a public authority of information relating
to an individual’s private life amounts to an interference within the meaning of
Article 8, and that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to
a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention”) (citing Gardel v. France, App. No.
16428/05, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 383, 402-07 (2009) (holding that, even though
based on a judgment by a court that was delivered to the public, the sensitive
nature of the information contained in a criminal record and the impact it may
have on the individual concerned relates to that person’s private life and amounts
to interference).
240 See Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
317, 329, ¶ 43 (2007) (noting that even nominal data, such as the date and length
of a phone call and the phone numbers dialed, may be protected by the right to
privacy because they constitute an “’integral element of the communications
made by telephone’ . . . [and that t]he mere fact that these data may have been
legitimately obtained” by a third party “in the form of telephone bills, is no bar to
finding an interference with rights guaranteed under Article 8.”) (citations
omitted); see also id. ¶ 48, at 330 (holding that that there was no legal basis
regulating monitoring of an employee’s telephone, email, or Internet usage at the
place of work).
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optimism that the Court would apply the principle of
proportionality in a way as to limit data collection from
surveillance authorities. The Court has already fast-tracked a case
brought by privacy and human rights advocates against Britain
ordering Ministers to justify Government Communication
Headquarters’ mass surveillance programs.241 An applicant before
the ECtHR does not need to be a national of one of the member
states, a policy that is in line with the Court’s role as promulgating
human rights in general.
3.4. Cloud Computing and the Safe Harbor
When the FISA Amendments Act was introduced in July 2008,
it introduced “remote computing services,” widening the scope to
include cloud computing.242 Cloud computing can be defined as
the distributed processing of data on remotely located computers
accessed through the Internet.243 Since information stored in the
cloud is stored in a physical machine owned by a company or
person in a specific country, it may be subject to the laws of the
country where the physical machine is located.244 As it may be
difficult though for an individual data subject to determine the
location of data storage in the online context,245 cloud providers are
241
Nick Hopkins, Justify GCHQ Mass Surveillance, European Court Tells
Ministers, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2014/jan/24/justify-gchq-mass-surveillance-european-court-humanrights?CMP=ema_follow (“[T]he court in Strasbourg has told the government to
provide submissions by the beginning of May about whether GCHQ’s spying
activities could be a violation of the right to privacy under article 8 of the
European convention.”).
242 The government can compel third party providers to disclose
communications content in RCS storage with an 18 U.S.C. § 27803(c) order. For
further discussion of Remote Computing Services under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, see Pell, supra note 221, at 249.
243
See generally CHRISTOPHER KUNER, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND DATA
PRIVACY LAW 121 (2013).
244 Robert Gellman, Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and Confidentiality
from Cloud Computing, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM (Feb. 23, 2009), at 7 (noting that the
physical location of information in the cloud may determine the legal rules that
apply); see also KUNER, supra note 243.
245 The difficulties may arise due to the reluctance of the data controller to
disclose such information based on concerns about data security, the fact that the
controller has poor informational policies, and the number of parties involved in
the processing, which complicates a determination about who is processing
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considered transnational companies subject to conflicts of public
international law. As a Note by Policy Department C of the
European Parliament explains, “[w]hich law they choose to obey
will be governed by the penalties applicable and exigencies of the
situation, and in practice the predominant allegiances of the
company management.” 246 As a cloud is made up of shared
systems and infrastructures, cloud providers process personal data
emanating from a wide range of sources in terms of data subjects
and organizations, allowing for the possibility that conflicting
interests might arise. Moreover, the outsourcing of concrete
services and chain processing involving multiple processors and
subcontractors may complicate matters even further.247 The cloud
client is rarely able to know where the data are located or stored or
transferred as they can move around all over the world.248
Cloud providers cannot fulfill any of the privacy principles on
which Safe Harbor is founded as this was not resolved
satisfactorily by the Commission: although U.S. cloud providers
advertise Safe Harbor certifications, the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party has clarified that existing protection is not
enough.249 Cloud clients are also exposed to the dangers of subprocessing by third parties since cloud providers usually do not
offer them such information.250 Further:
particular data at a particular time. It can also be unclear which location should
control the applicable law and jurisdiction – the location of the business
establishment of the data controller, or the location of the data. See id. at 122.
246 Bowden, supra note 20, at 22 (citation omitted).
247 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud
Computing, EUR. COMM’N (July 1, 2012), at 5 [hereinafter Article 29 Working Party
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/articleOpinion
5/2012],
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp196_en.pdf
(indicating the potential absence of client control when data is handled by a cloud
provider and outlining the risks associated with that absence of control). See
Article 29 Working Party Opinion 4/2000, supra note 77.
248 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2012, supra note 247, at 17 (“The
cloud client is therefore rarely in a position to be able to know in real time where
the data are located or stored or transferred.”).
249 Id. (“[S]elf-certification with Safe Harbor may not be deemed sufficient in
the absence of robust enforcement of data protection principles”); see also Bowden
supra note 20, at 22 (“[T]he EU is not addressing properly an irrevocable loss of
data sovereignty, and allowing errors made during the Safe Harbor negotiations
of 2000 to be consolidated, not corrected.”) (citation omitted).
250 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2012, supra note 247, at 17–18
(suggesting that national legislation should require that the terms regarding subprocessors, including their location and other data, be identified in the contract
between the cloud client and the cloud provider).
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Safe Harbor principles by themselves may also not
guarantee the data exporter the necessary means to ensure
that appropriate security measures have been applied by
the cloud provider in the US, as may be required by
national legislations based on the Directive 95/46/EC . . . .
In terms of data security, cloud computing raises several
cloud-specific security risks, such as loss of governance,
insecure or incomplete data deletion, insufficient audit
trails or isolation failures, which are not sufficiently
addressed by the existing Safe Harbor principles on data
security.251
The existing EU directive and the proposed Regulation outline
their territorial scope as covering “the processing of personal data
in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or
a processor in the Union, whether the processing takes place in the
Union or not.”252 The proposed regulation defines its territorial
scope as applying to non-EU companies that provide services
through the cloud, as it applies to “the processing of personal data
of [EU] data subjects residing in the Union by a controller not
established in the Union, where the processing activities are related
to: (a) the offering of goods or services to such data subjects in the
Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behavior.”253 Moreover, the
proposed privacy law is overbroad. The proposed regulation
associates monitoring the behavior of data subjects with the
processing techniques of profiling. However, there are many
innocuous activities that require the monitoring of data. For
instance, many cloud services track an individual’s data merely to
251 Id. at 18. Standard contractual clauses or binding corporate rules can also
be mediums of assuring protection on cross border data transfers. The Article 29
Working Party has underlined the need to make sure that processors who subcontract services out to sub-processors make this information available to the
client. This can be accomplished by detailing the type of service subcontracted, by
describing the characteristics of the current or potential sub-contractor, and by
setting out the obligations and responsibilities required by data protection
legislation in order to ensure effective control over and allocate clear
responsibility for processing activities. Id. at 9.
252 LIBE Committee Vote, supra note 162, at 6 (backing reform after an
overwhelming EU vote in favor of the proposals).
253 Id.; Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, at 41 (adopting the proposal
including Article 3, § 2).
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provide the individual with additional storage capacity. Because
the regulation fails to distinguish between these activities from real
profiling, it will prevent consumers from realizing many benefits
of networked intelligence.254 This is another reason the existing
Safe Harbor agreement is insufficient.255
A Working Party Opinion underlines the importance of adding
an additional restriction to the proposed regulation. Controllers
operating in the EU “must be prohibited from disclosing personal
data to a third country if so requested by a third country’s judicial
or administrative authority, unless this is expressly authorized by
an international agreement or provided for by mutual legal
assistance treaties or approved by a supervisory authority.”256 A
comprehensive international treaty is necessary to guarantee full
reciprocity of rights and to grant EU citizens equal protection to
U.S. citizens in U.S. courts. 257 The European Parliament should
consider amending the Data Protection Regulation to require
prominent warnings to individual data subjects of vulnerability to
political surveillance before EU Cloud data is exported to U.S.
jurisdiction. 258 European companies are using cloud-computing
services in the U.S. for the purposes of data storage. The company
offering the storage must subscribe to the Safe Harbor Principles
that are alternatives to a specific contractual arrangement between
the two companies regarding the treatment of personal data

254 See Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1623, 1644 (2013) (noting that equating monitoring with profiling creates
impediments to the legitimate use of networked intelligence). Likewise, the EU’s
broad interpretation of ‘automated processing’ creates concern that the regulation
would threaten “socially productive uses of analytics.” Id. at 1647. At the same
time, it can operate protectively against state surveillance by limiting the amount
of information that private actors can withhold.
255 Id.
256 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 05/2012, supra note 247, at 23 (“[I]t is of
the utmost importance to add to the future Regulation that controllers operating
in the EU must be prohibited from disclosing personal data to a third country if so
requested by a third country’s judicial or administrative authority, unless this is
expressly authorized by an international agreement or provided for by mutual
legal assistance treaties or approved by a supervisory authority.”). The opinion
went on to state that Regulation (EC) NO 2271/96 demonstrates an example of
legal ground for this proposition. The working party further stresses the need for
the Regulation to include the obligatory use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
in case of disclosures not authorized by Union or Member States law.
257 Bowden, supra note 20, at 22 (“The primary desideratum would be a
comprehensive international treaty guaranteeing full reciprocity of rights . . . .”).
258 Id.
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transferred to the U.S.259 Since the protection offered by the Safe
Harbor is not sufficient in reference to the national security
exception and unless the U.S. adheres to the Council of Europe
Convention 108, a special treaty is required which will extend the
protection that U.S. nationals enjoy to non-nationals.
Furthermore, the existing Directive and the Proposed
Regulation impose limitations on contractual freedom that conflict
with the U.S. Terms of Service or take-it-or-leave-it contracts for
cloud computing. EU law limits contracting out of the protection
afforded by it, whereas the standardized offers of many cloudcomputing services may impose contracting out of privacy
protection. 260 In the U.S., some state laws regulate cloud
computing by imposing obligations concerning data security, data
breach security notification, and data disposal.261 These differences
and the insufficiency of the Safe Harbor principles necessitate an
ad-hoc convention with the aim of elaborating model contractual
clauses concerning the guarantees of the use of information stored
in the cloud, which can also indirectly limit the amount of data that
ends in the hands of public authorities for intelligence purposes.262
A Working Party Opinion has elaborated requirements for the
minimum content of contractual safeguards of the “controller—
processor” relationships. Among those are the specification of
security measures that the cloud provider must comply with,
depending on the risks represented by the processing and the
259 E.g., Orange France is using the cloud computing services of Amazon U.S.
for data storage, which means that Amazon must subscribe to the Safe Harbor
Principles. A global company such as Mastercard – based in the U.S. and having a
large number of clients in the EU – obtains the flexibility it needs for operations by
subscribing to the Safe Harbor Principles while, at the same time, permitting the
free flow of data outside of the EU, subject to the respect of the Safe Harbor
Principles. See European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 5.
260 See Article 29 Working Party Opinion 05/2012, supra note 247, at 8
(discussing the imbalance of negotiating power with respect to contract terms
between the large service providers and the relatively small controller).
261 Schwartz, supra note 254, at 1659–60 (contrasting the broad ‘regulatory
thicket’ approach to data privacy in the EU with the U.S. approach, which has
relied more on contractual agreements and state-by-state regulation). California,
for example, has created a requirement of reasonable security when personal data
are processed. Applicable federal statutes in the healthcare and financial service
sectors provide more specific rules regarding the safeguards that must be in place
when personal information is processed, including when it is processed in the
cloud. Id. at 1660.
262 Cf. Schwartz, supra note 254, at 1659 (proposing that developing model
contractual clauses for cloud-client relationships would help the EU streamline
the regulatory process).
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nature of the data, the subject and time frame of the cloud service,
the extent, manner, and purpose of the processing, and the
specification of the conditions for returning the data or destroying
them once the service is concluded.263 Additional elements should
include confidentiality clauses or an express statement that the
cloud provider may not communicate the data to third parties,
unless they are subcontractors.264 The cloud provider is obligated
to provide a list of locations where the data may be processed and
to notify the cloud client about any legally binding request for
disclosure of the personal data by law enforcement unless
otherwise prohibited. There is also a general obligation to give
assurance that its internal organization and data processing
arrangements are compliant with the applicable national and
international legal requirements and standards.265
3.5. Does the Collection Meet the Requirements of the ICCPR?
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
protects privacy in Article 17. 266
According to the
recommendations of the special rapporteur, limitations to the right
See generally Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2012, supra note 247.
Id. at 13.
265 Id. at 13–14.
They must also inform clients about all subcontractors
contributing to the provision of the respective cloud service and all locations in
which data may be processed by the cloud provider and/or its subcontractors. Id.
at 20. The Committee of Experts Commissioned by the U.S. President to issue
proposals for a better protection recommends regarding encryption as a measure
to increase security and user confidence. The Committee also advises that the U.S.
government should fully support and not undermine efforts to create encryption
standards, and not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable
generally available commercial software.
The Committee urges the U.S.
government and U.S. companies to increase the use of encryption, in order to
better protect data in transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in other storage. LIBERTY
REPORT, supra note 93, at 216. The U.S. government thus should make it clear that
the NSA will not engineer vulnerabilities into the encryption algorithms that
guard global commerce, that it will not demand changes in any product by any
vendor for the purpose of undermining the security or integrity of the product, or
to ease NSA’s clandestine collection of information by users of the product, and
that it will not hold encrypted communication as a way to avoid retention limits.
The United States should not provide competitive advantage to U.S. firms by the
provision to those corporations of industrial espionage, and similarly it should
commit to international norms on the issue.
266
See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, art. 17.
263
264
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to privacy should pass the “permissible limitations test” foreseen
in Articles 21 and 22 of the same Covenant for the limitation of
freedom of assembly and freedom of association.267 According to
this test, “(a) restrictions must be prescribed by national law; (b)
they must be necessary in a democratic society; and (c) they must
serve one of the legitimate aims enumerated in each of the
provisions that contain a limitations clause.”268 The Human Rights
Committee has also set a permissible limitations test for the right to
privacy.269 These requirements mean that the essence of a human
right is not subject to restrictions, any restrictions must be
necessary for reaching the legitimate aim, and they must conform
to the principle of proportionality. 270 States may make use of
targeted surveillance measures, provided that it is case-specific
interference, on the basis of a warrant issued by a judge on
showing of probable cause or reasonable grounds. 271 Put
differently, “[t]here must be some factual basis, related to the
behavior of an individual, which justifies the suspicion that he or
she may be engaged in preparing a terrorist attack.” 272 The
principle of proportionality does not seem to be met by the
massive collection of data by the U.S. authorities for a number of
reasons.
First, there is no explicit obligation to minimize impact on nonU.S. persons outside the U.S. 273 According to a FISC opinion,
measures previously proposed by the government to comply with
this requirement have been found to be unsatisfactory in relation to
“upstream” collection and processing.274 New measures were only
found to be satisfactory for the protection of U.S. persons. 275

Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, at 8, Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009) (by Martin Scheinin)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur on Human Rights].
268
Id.
269 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27: Freedom of
Movement (Article 12), U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 1783rd mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 1, 1999).
270
Id.
271
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, supra note 267, at 9.
272
Id.
273
50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (1978) (foreseeing minimization procedures for U.S.
persons only).
274 FISC Oct. 3, 2011 Opinion, supra note 129, at 49.
275 Id. at 65.
267
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Furthermore, the FISC review does not include review of potential
measures to protect the personal information of non-U.S. persons
outside the U.S.276 “’[U]nreviewed data[,]’ collected under Section
702, is generally retained for five years, although data collected via
upstream collection is retained for two years.”277 The U.S. stated
that in fifty-four instances, collection under Sections 702 and 215
contributed to the prevention and combating of terrorism; twentyfive of those instances involved EU Member States.278
Furthermore, the technical impossibility to distinguish the
relevant communications from the non-relevant in many of the
NSA programs justifies the massive collection of data that does not
serve national security purposes. As the FISA Court noted in
multi-communication transactions (“MCTs”), “NSA acquires not
only the discrete communication that references the tasked
selector, but also in many cases the contents of other discrete
communications that do not reference the tasked selector and to
which no target is a party.”279 The sole reason these non-target
communications are collected is because they contain “’a tasked
selector used by a person who has been subjected to NSA’s
targeting procedures.’” 280 Moreover, upon acquisition, “NSA’s
upstream collection devices often lack the capability to determine
whether a transaction contains a single communication or multiple
communications, or to identify the parties to any particular
communication within a transaction.”281
The Court found that the upstream collection acquires tens of
thousands of discrete communications of non-target United States
persons and persons in the United States, protected by the Fourth
Amendment, “by virtue of the fact that their communications are
included in MCTs selected for acquisition by NSA’s upstream

AD HOC EU-U.S. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 138, at 11.
Id. These retention periods apply to all unreviewed data, including both
U.S. and non-U.S. person information.
278 The U.S. was unable to provide figures regarding Executive Order 12333.
The U.S. confirmed that out of the total of fifty-four cases, forty-two cases
concerned plots that were foiled or disrupted, and twelve cases concerned
material support for terrorism cases. Id. at 12.
279 FISC Oct. 3, 2011 Opinion, supra note 129, at 42–43. “By acquiring such
MCTs, NSA likely acquires tens of thousands of additional communications of
non-targets each year, many of whom have no relationship whatsoever with the
user of the tasked selector.” Id. at 43.
280 Id.
281 Id.
276
277
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collection devices.” 282 This means that communications were
collected concerning persons who are non-targets, located inside
the U.S. and for whom there is no reason to believe that all of their
discrete communication will be to, from, or about the targeted
selector. Additionally, if the person is in the U.S., the Court
presumes that the majority of that person’s communication will be
with other persons in the U.S., many of whom will be U.S.
persons.283 NSA acquires at least 1.3 million MCTs each year of
non-targets located outside the United States whose
communications will presumably be mostly with persons outside
the U.S., most of whom are non-U.S. persons.284 It also acquires
97,000–140,000 MCTs each year concerning persons whose identity
or location cannot be identified.285 This unknown category adds
substantially to the number of non-target communications of or
concerning United States persons or that are to or from persons in
the United States being acquired by NSA each year. 286 For the
same Court, “NSA’s collection of MCTs results in the acquisition of
a very large number of Fourth Amendment-protected
communications that . . . do not serve the national security needs
underlying the Section 702 collection . . . .”287 The U.S. President
committed to applying restrictions on the use of information
incidentally collected from communications between foreign
citizens and U.S. citizens under Section 702.288
In addition, there are doubts as to whether the telephony
metadata program provides information that cannot be provided
through more conventional investigative techniques. A Federal
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
284 FISC Oct. 3, 2011 Opinion, supra note 129, at 39–40 (discussing that “even
if only 1% of these MCTs contain a single non-target communication of or
concerning a United States person, or that is to or from a person in the United
States, NSA would be acquiring in excess of 10,000 additional discrete
communications each year that are of or concerning United States persons, or that
are to or from a person in the United States.”).
285 Id. at 40.
286 Id. at 41.
287 Id. at 78.
288 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Speech on NSA Reform
(Jan. 17, 2014) (transcript available at Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 Speech
on NSA Reforms, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Obama Speech],
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-jan-17speech-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-95564a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.
282
283
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district court examining a preliminary injunction found that there
is significant likelihood that the program constitutes an
“unreasonable search” under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, as the Government did not “cite a single instance in
which analysis of the NSA’s bulk metadata collection actually
stopped an imminent attack, or otherwise aided the Government in
achieving any objective that was time-sensitive in nature.”289
289 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 40 (D.D.C. 2013). For the court,
none of the three episodes cited by the government that supposedly illustrate the
role that telephony metadata analysis can play in preventing and protecting
against terrorist attack involved any apparent urgency. In the first case, the
metadata did not reveal any new information that had not already come to light
in the investigation up to that point; in the second, the metadata analysis was
used only after the terrorist was arrested “to establish [his] foreign ties and put
them in context with his U.S. based planning efforts[;]” in the third, the metadata
analysis “revealed a previously unknown number for [a] co-conspirator. . . and
corroborated his connection to [the target of the investigation] as well as to other
U.S.-based extremists.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The court cites Assistant
Director Holley of the FBI who concedes that bulk metadata analysis only
“sometimes provides information earlier than the FBI’s other investigative methods
and techniques.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); contra ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that relevance to an authorized
investigation under section 215 is to be defined broadly as concerning tangible
items which “bear on or could reasonably lead to other matter that could bear on
the investigation.”). For the court, since “there is no way for the Government to
know which particle of telephony metadata will lead to useful counterterrorism
information[,] . . . courts routinely authorize large-scale collections of information,
even if most of it will not directly bear on the investigation.” Id. at 747. For the
court, “aggregated telephony metadata is relevant because it allows the querying
technique to be comprehensive. And NSA’s warehousing of that data allows a
query to be instantaneous.” Id. at 748 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979), as controlling precedent which held that an individual has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information provided to third parties; the judge held
that the program is legal). First, according to the judge, NSA needs to collect bulk
telephony metadata to be able to query the telephony metadata database.
“Second, when it makes a query, it only learns the telephony metadata of the
telephone numbers within three ‘hops’ of the ‘seed.’ Third, without resort to
additional techniques, the Government does not know who any of the telephone
numbers belong to. . . . [It only sees] that telephone number A called telephone
number B.” Id. at 750–51. For the judge, “the Government’s subsequent querying
of the telephony metadata does not implicate the Fourth Amendment – any more
than a law enforcement officer’s query of the FBI’s fingerprint or DNA databases
to identify someone.” Id. at 751 (citing Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1963–64
(2013)). For the court, “there is no evidence that the Government has used any of
the bulk telephony metadata it collected for any purpose other than investigating
and disrupting terrorist attacks. While there have been unintentional violations of
guidelines, those appear to stem from human error and the incredibly complex
computer programs that support this vital tool. And once detected, those
violations were self-reported and stopped.” Id. at 757. In a recent report of the
New America Foundation on the effectiveness of the NSA Bulk Surveillance
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Similarly, the Committee of Experts commissioned by the
President found that the information contributed to terrorist
investigations by the use of Section 215 telephony metadata was
not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been
obtained in a timely manner using conventional Section 215
orders. 290 The Committee expressed caution as to whether the
program is “efficacious in alleviating concern about possible
terrorist connections, given the fact that the meta-data captured by
the program covers only a portion of the records of only a few
telephone service providers.”291 The Committee noted also that the
bulk telephony metadata collection program has experienced
several significant compliance issues, as the FISC found that for
two and a half years the NSA had searched all incoming phone
metadata using an “alert list” of phone numbers of possible
terrorists that had been created for other purposes, as almost 90
percent of the numbers on the alert list did not meet the
The FISC
“reasonable, articulable, suspicion” standard. 292
concluded that the minimization procedures had been “’so
frequently and systematically violated that it can fairly be said that
this critical element of the overall . . . regime has never functioned
effectively’” due to misunderstandings on the part of analysts
about the precise rules governing their use of the metadata. 293
Programs, this opinion was criticized as exhibiting substantial deference to the
government’s broad claims regarding its use of bulk collection under Section 215
and little examination of the particular cases beyond the government’s statements.
See Peter Bergen et al., Do NSA’s Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?, NEW
AM.
FOUND.
(Jan.
2014),
available
at
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/do_nsas_bulk_surveillance_p
rograms_stop_terrorists (noting that the role of the NSA in the cases of
individuals charged with some kind of terrorism crime was “limited and
insufficient to generate evidence of criminal wrongdoing without the use of
traditional investigative tools.”). The Report concludes that “the overall problem
for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that they need vaster amounts of
information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they don’t sufficiently
understand or widely share the information they already possess that was derived
from conventional law enforcement and intelligence techniques.” Id. at 3.
290 LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 104.
291 Id. The section 215 telephony metadata program has made only a modest
contribution to the nation’s security having generated relevant information in
only a small number of cases, while there has been no instance in which NSA
could say with confidence that the outcome would have been different without
the section 215 telephony metadata program.
292 In re Production of Tangible Things from [redacted], No. BR 08-13 (FISC
Mar. 2, 2009).
293 Id. at 105.
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According to the findings of the District Court for the District of
Columbia 294 and the Committee, the program does not seem to
meet the standards of the ICCPR.295
The Committee stresses that the government must end the
storage of bulk telephony under Section 215 and that it must
transition to a system in which the metadata are held either by
private providers or by a private third party. These private data
holders should only allow access to their archives only when the
FISC authorizes a Section 215 order that meets the requirements
described above. The court should require reasonable grounds to
believe that the information sought is relevant to an authorized
investigation protecting “’against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities’” and ensure “the order is
reasonable in focus, scope and breadth.” 296 This approach is
similar to the one followed by the EU in its data retention
directive. 297
Legislation might require relevant telephone
providers to retain the data for a specified period of time, though
no longer than two years, to ensure that it will be available if and
when the government needs to query it.298
294 See generally Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); LIBERTY
REPORT, supra note 93, at 105 (quoting FISC Judge Reggie Walton in his opinion
from Klayman v. Obama).
295 The same committee recommended that the statutes that authorize the
issuance of National Security Letters be amended to permit their issuance only
upon a showing that: “(1) the government has reasonable grounds to believe that
the particular information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation
intended to protect ‘against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities’ and (2) like a subpoena, the order is reasonable in focus, scope and
breadth.” LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 24. The committee also recommends
“that all statutes authorizing the use of National Security Letters should be
amended to require the use of the same oversight, minimization, retention, and
dissemination standards that currently govern the use of section 215 orders.” Id.
at 25. NSLs should not be issued by the FBI itself, but by a court, which would
mean “a significant expansion in the number of FISC judges, the creation within
the FISC of several federal magistrate judges to handle NSL requests, and use of
the Classified Information Procedures Act to enable other federal courts to issue
NSLs.” LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 93 (internal citation omitted).
296 LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 24. In a line of thinking where private
actors are more trusted by the government, the Committee notes that “the
government can query the information directly from the relevant service
providers after obtaining an order from the FISC,” as originally envisioned when
section 215 was enacted, a change that would greatly reduce the intake of
telephony metadata by NSA and would reduce the risk of government abuse. Id.
at 118.
297 See supra Part 3.2.
298 In that case, the government should reimburse the providers for the cost
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The President did not accept this proposal, and determined
that for reasons of accountability, it would be preferable for the
federal government to collect this data. 299 The President
committed to modifying the program in querying phone calls only
two steps (or “hops”) removed from a telephone number linked to
a terrorist network, instead of the current three steps removed
standard.300 He also committed to querying the database only after
“a judicial finding or in case of a true emergency.”301 The reason
put forward for the mass collection of telephone metadata is to
protect the information that might be useful at some point. The
difficulties in querying the material collected raise concerns as to
whether this insurance-style purpose meets the standard of
proportionality. If according to the recent reports, the material
provides only small parts of information, which also can be
obtained by the use of conventional investigative techniques, and
thanks to a better cooperation between the CIA and the FBI,302 then
the principle of proportionality does not appear to be met.
In general, there are doubts as to whether governments, unlike
of retaining the data. An FCC regulation already requires providers to hold such
information for 18 months, so it seems feasible to change the retention period for
telephone records. See LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 119; see also 47 C.F.R. §
42.6 (1986) (laying out rules for the retention of telephone toll records: ”Each
carrier that offers or bills toll telephone service shall retain for a period of 18
months such records as are necessary to provide the following billing information
about telephone toll calls: the name, address, and telephone number of the caller,
telephone number called, date, time and length of the call. Each carrier shall
retain this information for toll calls that it bills whether it is billing its own toll
service customers for toll calls or billing customers for another carrier.”).
299 See Obama Speech, supra note 288 (noting “any third party maintaining a
single, consolidated database would be carrying out what is essentially a
government function but with more expense, more legal ambiguity, potentially
less accountability – all of which would have a doubtful impact on increasing
public confidence that their privacy is being protected.”); see also Senator Dianne
Feinstein, Remarks at a Hearing on President’s Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies Before the Judiciary Committee (Jan. 14, 2014),
(transcript available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01-1414FeinsteinStatement.pdf) (highlighting Senator Feinstein’s belief that, in the
interest of timeliness, the state must be able to query the data at any time).
300 See Obama Speech, supra note 288.
301 Id.
302 See Bergen, supra note 289, at 7 (calling attention to “’serious doubts about
the efficacy of the metadata collection program as a means of conducting timesensitive investigations in cases involving imminent threats of terrorism.’”)
(quoting U.S. District Judge Richard Leon in his opinion from Klayman v.
Obama); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
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marketers, are able to conduct data mining in a way that might be
useful in actually serving the purpose of identifying terrorists.303
Data mining “occurs without legal guarantees for the accuracy or
appropriateness of the data or the searches, redress for people
injured by being falsely identified as posing a threat, or judicial or
legislative oversight.”304 The President addressed neither the issue
of massive data collection nor the NSA’s attempts to weaken
encryption technologies.
In May 2014, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence approved a compromise bill on NSA reforms that was
unanimously approved by the House Judiciary Committee.305 The
bill was passed in the House of Representatives on May 22, 2014.306
It was, however, defeated in the Senate on November 18, 2014.307
The bill would ban the bulk collection of all types of records, not
just the Section 215 phone metadata program. It would prohibit
other types of bulk collection by requiring that any records
obtained be linked to a specific person, account, or entity.308 The
bulk records would stay in the hands of phone companies, which
would not be required to retain them for any longer than they
normally would. 309 The government would be able to obtain
303 Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 3 (noting that although marketers
can use data mining to predict purchasing practices of customers, researchers
have demonstrated persuasively that it is impossible and unlikely ever to become
possible, to predict whether a person will take part in a terrorist act); see also Jeff
Jonas & Jim Harper, Effective Counterterrorism and the Limited Role of Predictive Data
Mining, POL’Y ANALYSIS (Dec. 11, 2006), at 3 (arguing “the possible benefits of
predictive data mining for finding planning or preparation for terrorism are
minimal. The financial costs, wasted effort, and threats to privacy and civil
liberties are potentially vast. Those costs outstrip any conceivable benefits of
using predictive data mining for this purpose.”).
304 Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 436 (2008).
305 House Intelligence Committee Approves NSA Reforms, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE (May 8, 2014) [hereinafter Brennan Center for Justice Report], available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/house-intelligence-committeeapproves-nsa-reforms.
306 Jonathan Weisman & Charlie Savage, House Passes Restraints on Bulk Data
Collection,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
22,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/us/politics/house-votes-to-limit-nsascollection-of-phone-data.html?_r=0.
307
Charlie Savage & Jeremy W. Peters, Bill to Restrict N.S.A. Collection Blocked
in Vote by Senate Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/us/nsa-phone-records.html.
308 See Brennan Center for Justice Report, supra note 305.
309 Charlie Savage, Obama to Call for End to N.S.A.’s Bulk Data Collection, N.Y.
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access to the records through a FISA court order to individuals’
phone records up to two “hops.” 310 The bill would not end
searches in which the government collects the content of phone
and email communications of foreigners overseas without a
warrant, and then searches them for communications to, from, or
about Americans. 311
The compromise bill omitted key
transparency provisions, including government reporting
requirements and a provision for a special advocate to argue the
other side in significant cases before the secret FISA Court.312
CONCLUSION
As the Committee of Experts commissioned by the President
notes, there are special historical reasons for which FISA protects
U.S. persons more strictly. The bill’s authors were particularly
concerned by the fact that at the time the law was enacted U.S.
citizens were the object of government surveillance in the U.S.313
The Committee cites a number of pragmatic reasons in support of
the need to increase protection for non-U.S. persons, among which
are the duty of reciprocity requiring that the U.S. treat other
citizens well if it wants its own citizens to be treated well by other
governments. 314 Second, aggressive surveillance policies under
Section 702 might trigger economic repercussions for American
businesses, potentially causing them to lose market shares due to
growing distrust of their capacity to guarantee the privacy of their
international users.315 Unrestrained American surveillance of non-

TIMES
(Mar.
24,
2014),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/us/obama-to-seek-nsa-curb-on-calldata.html?_r=0.
310 See Brennan Center for Justice Report, supra note 305.
311
Id.; see also The Editorial Board, A Stronger Bill to Limit Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
27,
2014),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/opinion/a-stronger-bill-to-limitsurveillance.html.
312
Brennan Center for Justice Report, supra note 305.
313 LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 154.
314 Id. at 155.
315 Id. at 155 (U.S. researchers estimate that as consequence of mistrust
caused by NSA program, $180 billion or 25% of U.S. overseas information
technology services risk to be lost by 2016); see also Allan Holmes, NSA Spying

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

TOURKOCHORITI (DO NOT DELETE)

522

4/17/2015 4:38 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 36:2

United States persons might alienate other nations, fracture the
unity of the Internet, and undermine the free flow of information
across national boundaries.
The EU, on the other hand, insists on the need to use the formal
channels negotiated between itself and the U.S., such as the Mutual
Legal Assistance agreement, in order to augment the exchange of
data for the prevention and investigation of criminal activities.316
A U.S.-EU Mutual Legal Assistance agreement has been in place
since 2003, which facilitates and accelerates assistance in criminal
matters between the EU and the U.S., including through the
exchange of personal information.317
The EU and the U.S. are currently negotiating a new
framework agreement on data protection in the field of police and
judicial cooperation.318 The EU authorities aim to ensure a high
level of data protection, in line with the EU data protection acquis
for citizens whose data is transferred across the Atlantic, thus
strengthening EU-U.S. cooperation in the fight against crime and
terrorism.319 Under U.S. law, Europeans who are not U.S. residents
do not benefit from the safeguards of the 1974 U.S. Privacy Act,
which limits judicial redress to U.S. citizens and legal permanent
residents. The Commission is requesting that EU citizens who are
not U.S. residents must be given enforceable rights, notably the

Seen Risking Billions in U.S. Technology Sales, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2013, 11:33 AM),
available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-10/nsa-spying-seen-risking-billionsin-u-s-technology-sales.html (finding that after a report surfaced that the NSA
built “backdoors” in technology security products sold overseas, U.S. technology
companies could see overseas sales drop by as much as $180 billion).
316 See Letter of Viviane Reding, Vice President, Eur. Comm’n, to Eric H.
Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 10, 2013), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoceu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf (pointing out to Attorney General
Holder that the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement “should be used to the
greatest possible extent”).
317 Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the European Union and
the United States of America, 2003 O.J. (L 181) 34, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:181:0034:0042:en:PDF.
318 Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55, at 8.
319
See Memorandum from the Eur. Comm’n, Joint Press Statement
Following the EU-US-Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting of 18
November 2013 in Washington (Nov. 18, 2013) (during which the EU and the U.S.
committed to complete the negotiations on the agreement ahead of summer 2014).
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right to judicial redress, and there seems to be willingness to
converge on this issue.320 The Commission also aims to narrowly
define the derogation based on national security. This “umbrella
agreement” on the general framework needed to ensure a high
level of protection of personal data when transferred to the U.S. for
the purpose of preventing or combating crime and terrorism, will
not provide the legal basis for any specific transfers of personal
data between the EU and the U.S. A specific legal basis for such
data transfers would always be required, such as a data transfer
agreement or a national law of an EU member state.
In parallel, there exists a special international agreement
dictating how data on passenger names collected by air carriers
would be shared and managed between the EU countries and the
U.S.321 Another special agreement between the EU and the United
States was concluded in order to secure adequate data protection
in SWIFT transaction. 322 The U.S. Treasury Department may

320 The negotiations aim also to limit how and for what purposes the data
can be transferred and processed, as well as the conditions for and the duration of
the retention of the data. How Will the EU’s Data Protection Reform Simplify the
Existing Rules?, EUR. COMM’N, available at http://ec.europa.eu /justice/dataprotection/document/review2012/factsheets/6_en.pdf.
321 Compare Agreement Between the United States of America and the
European Union on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record
(PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) (2007 PNR agreement), July 26, 2007, available at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/pnr2007agreement-usversion.pdf (binding the EU to ensure that air carriers operating
passenger flights to and from the USA will make available to the Department of
Homeland Security passenger data), with Council Decision 2012/472/EU, of 26
April 2012 on the Conclusion of the Agreement Between the United States of
America and the European Union on the Use and Transfer of Passenger Name
Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, 2012 O.J. (L 215)
4. The period during which PNR data may be stored and used is reduced from
fifteen to ten years for transnational serious crimes. PNR data is stored for fifteen
years for terrorism, and all data should be anonymized after six months. The
agreement shall remain in force until 2019.
322 Council Decision 2010/412/EU, on the Conclusion of the Agreement
Between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing
and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United
States for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 2010 O.J. (L
195) 3 (discussing the conclusion of the agreement between the EU and the U.S. on
the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the EU to the U.S.
for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program). The Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications is based in Belgium and is
the processor for most of the global money transfers from European Banks. The
SWIFT Agreement is valid for five years, until August 2015. Id. art. 3.
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request financial data from SWIFT only under narrowly defined
These concrete agreements present the
circumstances. 323
advantage of defining narrowly the circumstances of retention and
use of data allowing awareness of the persons concerned.
A necessary accommodation to the realities of modern life,
which means that individuals have to reveal personal information
to third parties, does not mean that they are willing to give up their
privacy entirely. In a world of complex technology, it is unclear
whether the distinction between “meta-data” and other
information carries much weight. 324 As Justice Sotomayor
observed about GPS monitoring of locational information in the
Jones case, data on telephone calls can reveal “a wealth of detail”
about an individual’s “familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.”325 Defining privacy as a right to control
who has access to a person means recognizing that the person is
entitled to consent to any use of the information that concerns her.
This is in accordance with a vision of privacy as deriving from the
general concept of human dignity, which means that human beings
are entitled to respect by the very fact that they are human beings.
The need to narrowly define the circumstances of violation of data
privacy is quintessential to the very legitimacy of the program.

323 Id. at 8. The request must identify as clearly as possible the financial data,
substantiate the necessity of the data, tailor the data as narrowly as possible to
minimize the amount of data requested, and not seek any data relating to the
Single Euro Payments Area. The department must store the financial data in a
secure physical environment where they are accessed only by analysts
investigating terrorism or its financing, and the financial data must not be
interconnected with any other database. Id. at 8.
324 See July 13 Version: International Principles on the Application of Human
Rights to Communications Surveillance, NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE (July 10,
2013), available at http://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text (discussing the
relationship between privacy rights and the current digital surveillance
technologies). The Committee commissioned by the president recommends that
the government should commission a study of the legal and policy options for
assessing the distinction between metadata and other types of information. See
LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 120.
325 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (noting calling data reveals “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal
defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque,
synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on”) (internal quotations omitted)
(citation omitted).
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